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Executive summary
Since first introduced under Labour, academy schools have been the main way that 
governments have sought to raise the standard of schools. Their popularity with 
policymakers means that two fifths of state-educated children in England now attend an 
academy. While there are different forms of academies, all have greater responsibility over 
the curriculum, staffing and finances than other state-funded schools. 
Yet the evidence that academies have improved school education is not clear cut. 
Labour’s academies have almost certainly led to sustainable improvements in pupil 
outcomes. However, the Coalition Government’s academies have had variable impact, 
with some lowering, some sustaining and others improving education in those schools, 
depending on the starting point of the school. Taken in its entirety, the evidence suggests 
that the recent academies are not having the transformative impact on education that was 
expected by government.
The Conservative Government has changed its approach to academies. It now expects all 
new academies to join or establish an academy chain – groups of two or more academies 
run by the same sponsor – believing that chains will help unleash the potential of 
academies to spread educational excellence across the country. Yet, as with individual 
academies, the evidence on academy chains shows variable impact on pupil attainment. 
There is a dearth of information explaining why, as no research has established a full 
enough picture of what academy chains do. 
To address this research gap, Reform has undertaken the first survey of academy chains. 
The respondents were chief executives from 66 academy chains responsible for a total of 
around 700 academies. The results show a varied picture of chain operations, with some 
highly centralised and others devolving more responsibility to schools. It also shows that 
most chains want to expand, regardless of their current size. However, their key priority is 
to reduce disparities in pupil attainment across their chain, suggesting that chains want a 
role in spreading excellence. While many are interested in running low-performing 
schools, the school’s finances and geographical location remain a barrier. 
Drawing on these results, along with unstructured interviews with chain chief executives, 
the report highlights four problems with current policy. First, academy chains are not 
routinely granted enough financial autonomy over their academies. Second, the process 
of matching schools to chains is not transparent or independent, and is therefore open to 
conflict. Third, this opacity is hindering competition between chains. Fourth, chains are 
not effectively incentivised to run schools that are in need of support.
Reform recommends a new approach to the funding, commissioning, oversight and 
accountability arrangements for academy schools to help them reach their potential. It 
recommends that funding for academies be allocated to the chain for them to dispense 
as they see fit, alongside more robust accountability measures. Commissioning decisions 
should be taken by an independent body, based on transparent criteria, and with all 
chains able to put themselves forward to run schools. There should be more stringent, 
and more generous, grants for chains that decide to run schools that have previously 
failed, find themselves in financial difficulties, or are otherwise undesirable to run. 
Reform’s recommendations are aimed at helping the Government achieve its ambition of 
improving education for all. Without a rejuvenation of this flagship government 
programme, academies will not have the impact they were hoped to have. The academy 
chain survey results can be found in Annex B. 
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Summary of recommendations
1. All revenue funding for academies should be delegated to academy chains before 
being distributed by the chain to its academies. The academy chain should take 
responsibility for funding its academies and agreeing how much each academy should 
receive. The delegation of academy budgets to chains should be irrespective of the 
chain’s size or performance. The Department for Education’s (DfE) funding allocation to 
the academy chain must be based on a national funding formula (NFF) for pupils to 
ensure each chain’s settlement is fair. As the implementation of the NFF has been 
delayed until 2018-19, the delegation of academy funding to chains should start 
immediately to allow chains to more easily address inconsistent funding across 
academies in different local authorities.
2. The DfE should amend the Academies Financial Handbook to remove the 
requirement on trusts to have an appeals mechanism in place for headteachers that 
wish to dispute how the chain distributes its funding.
3. There should be one, independent body responsible for commissioning academies. 
This would require merging the financial accountability functions of the Education 
Funding Agency (EFA) with the oversight on standards of the Schools Commissioning 
Group (SCG). The responsibility for funding academies should not rest with the 
independent commissioner, but remain with an executive agency of the DfE. If all 
schools become academies, the Government should consider merging the new 
commissioning body with the schools wing of Ofsted, so that there is one independent 
regulator of all schools.
4. The DfE should evaluate the capacity of the new independent commissioning body. It 
should undertake a skills audit and consider external recruitment, such as from existing 
headteacher boards, to address skills gaps.
5. The independent commissioning body should develop, agree and manage the 
Secretary of State’s contracts with academy sponsors. Sponsor bids and the 
management of sponsor contracts (‘funding agreements’) should be jointly assessed on 
evidence of financial propriety and educational standards in the chain. Every funding 
agreement should include an expectation of the chain’s educational performance, in 
addition to financial performance. This element of the sponsor agreement could relate to 
the DfE’s MAT performance tables. However, there should be scope for the 
commissioner to develop bespoke funding agreements to encourage sponsors to take 
on schools that have both poor finances and pupil outcomes.
6. Ofsted and the independent commissioning body should consult with academy chain 
leaders to identify the characteristics of an ‘inadequate’ academy chain. In the long-
term, these characteristics should be based on pupil outcomes, such as the aggregate 
MAT performance measures developed by the DfE. Until performance measures are 
sufficient to judge all academy chains, a framework for recognising poor practice should 
be used to inform a judgement.
7. The DfE should facilitate a real-time online sponsor forum with instantaneous 
information on approved sponsors and schools requiring or desiring a sponsor. Once a 
school or academy is deemed ‘inadequate’, its information should automatically be 
uploaded to the sponsor forum. Any other maintained school looking for a sponsor may 
upload their information voluntarily. Academy sponsors should be uploaded on the 
forum as soon as they are approved. The forum would allow sponsors to contact 
schools and vice versa.
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8. The online sponsor forum should facilitate expressions of interest from sponsors to 
take over a school. The expressions of interest, similar to a short bid, will be submitted 
online and set out how the sponsor will improve standards in the school, including 
supporting evidence. These expressions should be assessed by the independent 
commissioning body on the basis of the needs of the pupils in the school and the 
capacity of the sponsor. The capacity of the sponsor should be determined by its current 
performance and a growth readiness check.
9. Academy chains should continue to be able to seek approval from Regional School 
Commissioners to voluntarily release some or all of their schools. The schools in 
question must not be deemed ‘inadequate’ or ‘coasting’, and the chain should be 
required to find a sponsor willing to take the school(s) on. The school swap should not 
require permission from the headteacher or local governing body of the school in 
question. There should be a three-year protection on a school before it can be swapped 
again.
10. The Government should abandon its proposal to introduce parental petitions in 
favour of requiring all chains to have a clear method for engaging with their pupils’ 
parents.
11. All infrastructure funding for academy chains should be pooled to create a struggling 
school premium. The school commissioning body should identify schools that are 
attached to this premium, either due to poor educational performance, their small size, 
geographical remoteness or poor financial circumstances. The premium should follow 
the school, and any sponsor winning a bid to take over the school should be paid the 
premium, and no more.
12. The commissioning body should consult the sector to identify a percentage of the 
struggling school premium that can be recouped by government if the trust fails to 
deliver to its sponsor agreement.
13. All academy chains should be expected to invest their own reserves in their 
infrastructure, in addition to public capital funding through the struggling school 
premium. If a trust is required or seeks permission to release some or all of its 
academies, it should absorb any deficits and keep any reserves.
14. The DfE should amend the Governors’ Handbook to allow maintained schools and 
academies to pay local governors.
15. Ofsted should review its framework on inspecting governance in academies. It 
should focus inspection on identifying strong internal accountability at every level within 
a trust. While it should be made explicit that parent governors are not required, Ofsted 
should continue to expect a clear mechanism for engaging parents in every individual 
academy.
16. The Government should continue to seek private funding for its Academy 
Ambassadors programme. It should consider encouraging the development of teaching 
trusts to attract and develop aspiring middle and senior leaders of academy chains.
17. There should continue to be no restrictions on a local authority’s (LA) ability to sell 
services to an academy chain, both within and outside their LA region.
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Glossary of key terms 
Academy chain  A formal partnership between two or more academies. 
The partnership can be in the form of a multi-academy 
trust, umbrella trust or collaborative partnership.
Academy  A state-funded school that receives funding directly from 
central government rather than a local authority 
(including free schools, studio schools and university 
technology colleges). It is not statutorily required to 
follow the National Curriculum, follow national terms and 
conditions for staff, or involve the local authority in 
running the school. 
 > Sponsored academy  A previously maintained school that was identified as 
‘inadequate’ by Ofsted and required to become an 
academy as part of the Government’s intervention 
strategy.
 > Converter academy  A previously maintained school that voluntarily applied to 
become an academy and is usually judged as either 
‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ by Ofsted. 
Academy trust / trust  A registered charity and company whose members must 
appoint trustees to uphold the academy’s contract with 
the Secretary of State for Education. 
Articles of association  A contract between the Secretary of State for Education 
and the academy trust setting out the internal 
management, decision-making and running of the 
academy trust.
Board member / member  A person with ultimate responsibility for the trust, 
including the ability to appoint trustees and sign the 
articles of association. They cannot be employees of the 
trust, and there must be at least three members to form 
a multi-academy trust.
Chief executive / chief 
executive officer
 The executive leader of an academy chain, appointed by 
the directors. They are part of the executive team and 
may also be a trustee.
Education funding agency 
(EFA)
 The executive agency of the Department for Education 
whose statutory responsibility it is to allocate current and 
capital funding to all academies, and all maintained 
schools through local authorities.
Executive team  The people appointed by the trustees to run the 
academy trust, including the Chief Executive, Finance 
Director or Executive Principal.
Funding agreement  A contract between the Secretary of State for Education 
and the academy trust which provides the framework for 
the academy trust to operate within.
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General annual grant (GAG)  The stream through which academies receive the 
majority of their current funding. The funding is allocated 
through the EFA, and it does not include capital funding 
or the Pupil Premium Grant.
Governing body  The group of individuals that are legally responsible for a 
maintained school. In an academy trust, the trustees 
can delegate governance functions to a (local) governing 
body, but it is not required to do so.
Maintained school  Schools that are funded through the local authority, 
including voluntary-aided (such as faith schools), 
community, voluntary-controlled and foundation 
schools. 
Multi-academy trust (MAT)  An academy trust with responsibility for running three or 
more academies (three academies is the DfE’s normal 
working definition). Some trusts are counted as MATs in 
official figures even if they run just one academy, if the 
MAT has plans to grow.
Regional school 
commissioner (RSC)
 A person that manages the work of the School 
Commissioners Group in a specific region (see below).
Rebrokerage  The process of finding a new sponsor for an academy 
whose funding agreement has been terminated due to 
an ‘inadequate’ judgement from Ofsted. This is carried 
out by the National or Regional School Commissioner.
Schools commissioners 
group (SCG)
 A group of civil servants in the Department for Education 
responsible for developing high-quality academy 
sponsors, tackling underperformance in maintained 
schools and academies through academy conversion 
and rebrokerage, and establishing new school provision 
through free schools.  
Sponsor  An organisation or person that has received approval 
from the DfE to support an underperforming academy 
trust. They could be an existing academy trust, a 
university, a business, an independent school, a 
diocesan body or a charity.
Trustee / director  The individuals appointed by the academy trust’s 
members with responsibility for the trust’s strategy, 
financial stewardship and overall performance. They 
must comply with their statutory duties as both 
company directors and charitable trustees.
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1.1 An ‘all academy’ vision 
The Government has set out an endgame for the academies programme. Since 
publishing its white paper earlier this year, it has reaffirmed its “continued determination to 
see all schools to become academies in the next 6 years”.1 Retracting its previous 
proposal to mandate all schools to convert or have plans in place to convert by 2022, the 
Government’s current policy is to seek new legal powers to direct all schools to become 
academies in areas where the local authority “can no longer viably support its remaining 
schools” or when it “fails to meet a minimum performance threshold across its schools”.2 
This marks a substantially different policy approach towards school autonomy than that of 
both the Coalition Government and any predecessor government since the Education 
Reform Act 1988. Grant-maintained schools and City Technology Colleges, introduced 
and developed by the 1987 and 1990 Conservative Governments, were the first forms of 
independently-run, state-funded schools in England and their boards had greater control 
over governance, funding and the curriculum.3 This specialist school movement was 
expanded upon by the 1997 Labour Government’s City Academy programme with one 
substantial difference: city academies acted as a challenge to existing poor school 
provision.4 Only those schools judged as ‘inadequate’ by Ofsted were taken over by a 
sponsor (usually a charity, business or philanthropists), with additional capital funding 
invested by both the sponsor and government.5  
The Academies Act 2010 pioneered a new approach. In addition to using school 
autonomy as a lever to challenge poor performance, the Coalition Government hoped 
autonomy would allow already good schools to get even better. The Act allowed any 
school judged by Ofsted as ‘outstanding’ or ‘good with outstanding features’ to apply for 
academy conversion,6 making the attainment of those Ofsted ratings an attractive goal. 
However, just how attractive academisation would become was not fully understood.7 
From 2010 the number of academies grew exponentially: the 200 existing academies 
established under eight years of Labour reached over 1,000 academies in just one year of 
Coalition.8
Today around 65 per cent of state-funded secondary and 18 per cent of state-funded 
primary schools are academies.9 That equates to roughly 66 per cent of state school pupils 
aged 11 to 16 years and 20 per cent of pupils aged 5 to 11 years currently being taught in 
academies.10 This new environment means the Government is embarking on a radically 
different set of policies from both the Labour and Coalition Governments. While many 
consider the explicit push to convert all schools to academies as endorsement of the 
academy model, removing the choice to convert is, by extension, removing some of the 
incentives to become an outstanding school. If this implication is understood, then the 
Conservative Government’s policy of coerced academisation suggests it has lost belief in 
the power of school autonomy as a carrot for ‘good’ and ‘outstanding’ schools to improve.
This is premature. No published research has yet examined the impact of the Coalition’s 
converter academies while also robustly comparing like-for-like schools (those that later 
go on to become academies). The National Foundation for Educational Research has 
compared the performance of converter academies with maintained schools that have 
1  Department for Education, ‘Next Steps to Spread Educational Excellence Everywhere Announced’, Press release, 
(2016).
2  Ibid.
3	 	City	Technology	Colleges	specialised	in	vocational	qualifications	and	many	of	the	early	academies	specialised	in	the	
Arts.
4  The specialist school movement also grew through the creation of new, local-authority maintained Technology 
Colleges, whereas all but three of the original City Technology Colleges established has now converted to academy 
status.
5  House of Commons, Academies under the Labour Government	(London:	The	Stationery	Office,	2016).
6  This requirement was later relaxed to allow any ‘good’ school to apply for conversion.
7  BBC Radio 4, ‘A Subversive History of School Reform, Analysis’, 24 July 2016.
8	 	Department	for	Education,	Schools, Pupils and Their Characteristics: January 2016, 2016.
9  Ibid.
10  Ibid.
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the same “propensity” to convert.11 It found that in 2015 average KS4 (GCSE) attainment 
was one-third higher in academies than similar maintained schools, with disadvantaged 
pupils making on average one-third of a GCSE grade more progress from KS2 to KS4 in 
academies.12 Results for primary converter academies were not statistically significant. 
Recent research by the London School of Economics and the Education Policy Institute 
(EPI) does, however, support the stick hypothesis for post-2010 sponsored academies. It 
shows there is a leap in KS4 attainment13 in the year prior to becoming an academy which 
is not sustained in the years after conversion and falls to zero improvement after three 
years.14 This suggests it could be the imminent threat of conversion that causes schools 
to focus on KS4 pupils and temporarily boost results. However, the researchers state it is 
difficult to discern how much of the fall in results is due to the sponsored academies 
getting worse or comparative maintained schools getting better.
The research on Labour’s pre-2010 sponsored academies is more substantial and 
positive. Research shows that for these schools there were marginal improvements in 
KS4 results in the four years prior to becoming an academy and then much greater, 
sustained improvements each year for at least three years after conversion.15 However, 
evidence suggests that over time sponsored secondary academies attract a higher 
attaining intake,16 coexistent with a lower attaining intake in neighbouring maintained 
schools.17 Other research has found no difference in pupil attainment in primary 
sponsored academies, but one GCSE grade improvement for pupils eligible for free 
school meals in secondary schools.18 
In How to run a country: Education, Reform made the case that all schools should be 
afforded the freedoms of academies,19 as international evidence suggests that school 
autonomy, supplemented with strong public accountability, are common features of high 
performing school systems.20 Nonetheless, any change in the system must look carefully 
at the school’s motivation for academisation. While both the original city academies and 
current sponsored academies had a strong financial incentive to convert,21 the idea 
behind the programmes was to challenge existing poor provision of schools. However, it 
is not clear that ‘coerced academisation’ retains either the carrot or stick hypothesis of 
school improvement. 
Nevertheless, there must be recognition that the current school system is stuck between 
two different models with different commissioning and oversight arrangements. Given the 
scale of academisation, it is unlikely that the trend towards full academisation in England 
can be reversed. It is policymakers’ job to get the most out of the new system. One 
emerging phenomenon in which there is much hope is the academy chain. The sections 
below explore how academy chains could, in theory, support school autonomy and 
improve pupil results, particularly for the disadvantaged.  
11  In this research, ‘similar schools’ refer to the proportion of pupils achieving 5+ A*-C GCSEs, the proportion achieving 
National Curriculum level 4 in English and maths, proportion of pupils on Free School Meals, number of pupils in the 
school and the school’s most recent Ofsted rating.
12  National Foundation for Educational Research, Analysis of Academy School Performance in 2015 (London: NFER, 
2016).
13  The researchers control for pupil characteristics and pupil mobility.
14  Andrew Eyles et al., The Impact of Post-2010 Sponsored Academies (London: LSE in partnership with EPI, 2016).
15  Andrew Eyles et al., The Impact of the Academies Programme: Research Findings from the Education Policy Institute 
and the London School of Economics (London: LSE in partnership with EPI, 2016).
16  Measured by KS2 primary results. 
17  Eyles et al., The Impact of Post-2010 Sponsored Academies.
18  National Foundation for Educational Research, Analysis of Academy School Performance in 2015.
19  Amy Finch and James Zuccollo, How to Run a Country: Education (Reform, 2015).
20  Sean Coughlan, ‘Academies ‘Promising Trend’ Says OECD’, BBC News, 3 May 2016.
21  City Academies were typically given start-up grants of around £25 million from government and would need to source 
around £2 million private sponsorship, though some of this included funding for new buildings. See Justine Parkinson, 
‘Why the Fuss over City Academies?’, BBC News, 17 March 2005.
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1.2 Academy chains: making the most of school autonomy
As the number of academies has grown, so too has the number of academy chains. 
Academy chains are groups of academies that together hold one contract (funding 
agreement) with central government through the Education Funding Agency (EFA). 
Academy chains are not-for-profit organisations (legally defined as both a company and 
charity) with trustees legally responsible for delivering the contract, and a chief executive 
or executive principal held to account by the trustees.22 Articles of association, agreed 
with the EFA, set out the internal management and decision-making power within the 
academy chain.
The Department for Education (DfE) usually adopts the term multi-academy trust (MAT) to 
refer to an academy trust that runs three or more academies. The authors prefer to 
maintain the term academy chain for two reasons.  Firstly, the DfE has given some 
standalone academies MAT status, as these MATs have aspirations for future growth.23 
Secondly, some academy chains are made up of more than one MAT, despite having the 
same academy sponsor. For example, AET is an academy chain with one MAT 
(Academies Enterprise Trust) and a subsidiary trust (London Academies Enterprise Trust). 
The authors use the term academy chain herein to refer to all MATs with two or more 
academies, MATs with the same sponsor, umbrella trusts and collaborative partnerships 
– where individual academies have separate funding agreements with the DfE. In reality, 
the overwhelming majority of academy chains referred to in this report will be MATs. We 
retain the term MAT to refer to the survey questions and responses, and to any literature 
that adopts this term.
Despite the growth in academy chains, just under half of all academies are standalone 
schools, and the majority of chains have only two to five schools (see Figure 1). The 
largest chain has 69 academies which is much smaller than the average size of schools 
previously managed by a local authority (roughly 160 schools) or some of the international 
private schools (Doga has just under 100).24 
Figure 1: Rise of academies by size of academy trust
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Source: Reform calculations; Department for Education, Open academies and academy 
projects in development, 2016.
22  National College for Teaching and Leadership, Governance in Multi-Academy Trusts, 2015, 4.
23  It is understood that the motivation is to make it less bureaucratic for a trust to take on new schools.
24  Doga Schools, “About Us,” Webpage, 2016.
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The Government believes that academy chains are “the best long term formal 
arrangement for stronger schools to support the improvement of weaker schools”.25  
The recent white paper, Educational Excellence Everywhere, set out an expectation that 
“[m]ost schools will form or join MATs, given the benefits they offer”.26 Schools converting 
to academy status will be expected to join a chain, and will only be allowed to operate as 
standalone academies in “exceptional circumstances”.27 
This marks a fundamental structural change to education in England, with academy 
chains set to replace the role of the local authority (LA) in directly running schools. It is 
therefore reasonable to ask firstly whether the function of an academy chain and LAs are 
comparable and, if they are, whether one is better placed to drive school improvement 
than the other. 
The Government considers there to be four key advantages to academy chains over local 
authorities. According to its white paper, Educational Excellence Everywhere, academy 
chains:
 > Prevent geographical monopolies with different MATs operating in a given 
area, increasing diversity of provision and giving parents more choice and 
competition. If performing well, MATs can scale their success nationwide, taking 
effective models from one part of the country to the toughest areas in a way that 
no high-performing local authority ever could 
 > Provide opportunities to bring together educational expertise with business 
and financial skills in innovative and efficient organisations that can deliver 
better outcomes from the resources available
 > Offer a clear, single point of accountability where the leader of the MAT has 
the powers and funding to bolster standards in the schools for which he or she is 
responsible, and is completely accountable for the results
 > Direct funding for the whole group of schools where it can do most good, 
commissioning support and services from a variety of providers, or developing 
the services themselves if they think they can perform better28
There is no clear evidence on whether the academy chain model of school improvement 
outlined above is more effective than the LA model. Some consider the comparison to be 
fundamentally flawed, as LAs and academy chains take different roles in the management 
of their academies. 29 Nevertheless, the EPI has attempted to compare the two, and finds 
that academy chain performance is just as variable as the aggregate performance of 
schools run by local authorities.30 
That academy chain performance is variable is the main conclusion of the research on 
chain effectiveness. The DfE has found an even split of academy chains above and below 
overall average improvement in KS2 value-added three years after takeover, and slightly 
more chains below than above31 for KS4 value-added.32 The EPI research (which used the 
DfE’s methodology but also calculated performance for LAs) similarly found an even 
spread across chains and LAs in the top and bottom quintile for performance and 
improvement. For two years running, the Sutton Trust has found that there are about as 
25  Department for Education, Educational Excellence Everywhere, 2016, 5.
26	 	Ibid.,	58.
27  Ibid.
28  Ibid., 59.; emphasis added. 
29  See Department for Education, Statistical Working Paper: Measuring the Performance of Schools within Academy 
Chains and Local Authorities, 2015; Merryn Hutchings, Becky Francis, and Philip Kirby, Chain Effects 2016: The Impact 
of Academy Chains on Low-Income Students (London: The Sutton Trust, 2016).
30  Jon Andrews, School Performance in Multi-Academy Trusts and Local Authorities - 2015 (Education Policy Institute, 
2016).
31	 	However,	this	is	not	necessarily	an	accurate	reflection	of	the	trust’s	impact	at	KS4	as	it	represents	a	disproportionate	
amount of historically underperforming schools. This is not the case at KS2.
32  Department for Education, Statistical Working Paper: Multi-Academy Trust Performance Measures: England, 2014 to 
2015, 2016.
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many academy chains that have narrowed the attainment gap (compared to two years 
prior) as those that have seen a widening of the attainment gap.33 
Research published by Reform has highlighted the potential of academy chains.34 In 
Education in chains, Grotberg and Robb argued that academy chains could provide clearer, 
more capable governance at a lower overall cost. This could be achieved through more 
expert management, skilled governors recruited into full-time, salaried positions, 
opportunities for professional development and mechanisms for driving economies of scale 
through central procurement of goods and services across all academies.35 However, it is 
not yet clear whether academy chains are able to capitalise these opportunities.
The next stage for policy research is to understand why variation between academy chain 
performance exists, and examine what behavioural aspects are associated with high 
performance. This means understanding more about what academy chains do. For a fair 
assessment to be made, academy chains must be given time to develop. However, a 
greater understanding of how chains are currently operating will help cast light on whether 
they are on track to reach their potential. 
1.3 Chain whispers
To date, there has been no rigorous analysis of how academy chains operate. Anecdotal 
evidence and case studies have informed the majority view, and while there have been 
several recent attempts to monitor the performance of academy chains, there is not 
enough evidence to draw conclusions about successful characteristics. Nevertheless, 
there have been numerous attempts to monitor the development of academy chains, 
identify good practice from case studies and share views on what works.36 The Education 
Select Committee has also established an inquiry to investigate what makes a successful 
MAT.37 While the evidence base is weak, the brief overview below offers a starting point 
for assessing the Government’s four claims, and provides context on commonly held 
assumptions about academy chains.
1.3.1 Geographical reach
The education white paper states that the absence of arbitrary geographical limits on 
growth means “MATs can scale their success…in a way that no high-performing local 
authority ever could”.38 The logical implication of this position is that geographical flexibility 
makes academy chains a more effective arrangement for addressing regional 
performance disparities than local authorities.
As academy chains grow across LA boundaries, one important consideration is how 
geographically condensed or dispersed chains should be. The Chief Inspector of Ofsted, 
Sir Michael Wilshaw, has presented both wide geographical dispersion of academies 
within chains and lack of leadership capacity as “a considerable challenge”.39 In oral 
evidence to the Education Select Committee, the National Schools Commissioner, Sir 
David Carter, commented that some chains “set up in the very early days…were 
geographically too widespread” and that he “remain(s) a real fan and believer that a closer 
geographical mix is the best one”.40
33  Merryn Hutchins, Becky Francis, and Philip Kirby, Chain Effects 2015: The Impact of Academy Chains on Low-Income 
Students (London: The Sutton Trust, 2015); Hutchings, Francis, and Kirby, Chain Effects 2016: The Impact of Academy 
Chains on Low-Income Students.
34  Anna Grotberg and Matthew Robb, Education in Chains (Reform, 2015), 10
35  Ibid., 23.
36  See, for example, Department for Education, Characteristics of Successful Multi-Academy Trusts, 2015. 
37  Education Select Committee, ‘Multi-Academy Trusts Inquiry’, Webpage, 2016.
38  Department for Education, Educational Excellence Everywhere, 15.
39  Sir Michael Wilshaw, ‘Focused Inspections of Academies in Multi-Academy Trusts’, 10 March 2016, 3.
40  Sir David Carter, ‘Oral Evidence to the Education Select Committee: Multi-Academy Trust Inquiry’, 15 June 2016.
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1.3.2 Commercial skills
The DfE expects that, as academy chains expand, individual academies will benefit from 
streamlined and more highly skilled executive boards, particularly in sponsored chains.41 
This, they suggest, will have the dual benefit of allowing more effective professional 
management of the schools in the trust and allowing school-level governors to focus on 
the more direct needs of pupils, as opposed to school administration.42
There is wide agreement that commercially skilled trustees and board members are a 
feature of high-performing academy chains, underlining both the potential chains have to 
attract high-skilled people and their ability to deliver better outcomes. When identifying 
characteristics of successful chains, the DfE emphasise the importance of commercially 
skilled roles by suggesting a succession plan for “key posts” within the chain, including 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Finance Director.43 A pamphlet by the Association of 
School and College Leaders, the National Governors Association and Browne Jacobson 
echo the importance of commercial skills on the academy chain executive board, 
particularly as the chain expands.44 Research into US Charter Schools also recommends 
the executive board taking a more strategic role and devolving operational responsibility 
for schools.45
1.3.3 Accountability
Proponents of academy chains believe they offer a simpler accountability structure than 
schools maintained by the LA. In maintained schools, central government, the council and 
the school leadership play a significant role in determining school performance: central 
government exercises control over curricula; local authorities set and monitor a local 
financial framework; school leadership delivers the prescribed curricula and manages their 
delegated budget.46 By contrast, the school leadership in an academy chain is ultimately 
responsible to the trustees. The chain leadership has a high degree of autonomy and is 
itself responsible for monitoring and evaluating the performance of its individual 
academies.47
Concerns remain however about holding chains to national standards in terms of school 
performance and financial accounting. For example, in evidence submitted to the 
Education Select Committee, academics from the Alliance Manchester Business School 
questioned the ability of the EFA to effectively oversee financial management on a chain 
level, and suggested financial data be published by individual academies to improve 
accountability.48 The Sutton Trust, teachers and the national leaders of governance have 
also questioned whether the chain model – by virtue of its large scale – actually erodes 
accountability on a local level.49
1.3.4 Economies of scale and financial autonomy
The Government’s white paper argues that “[h]igh quality sponsors can… delivering (sic) 
economies of scale and strong financial sustainability”.50 The implication is that chains 
deliver these savings by centralising functions, such as procurement and staff terms and 
conditions, in return for a ‘top-slice’ charged to the school. The chain leadership can also 
41  Department for Education, Educational Excellence Everywhere, 50; Department for Education, Accountability and 
Governance: Research Priorities and Questions, 2014, 10.
42  Department for Education, Educational Excellence Everywhere, 50.
43  Department for Education, Characteristics of Successful Multi-Academy Trusts,	8.
44  Association of School and College Leaders, National Governors’ Association, and Browne Jacobson, ‘Leading and 
Governing Groups of Schools’, 2015, 26.
45  Charter Board Partners, Governance Best Practices (Washington DC, 2014).
46  Department for Education, Making “Prescribed Alterations” to Maintained Schools, 2016.
47  National College for Teaching and Leadership, Governance in Multi-Academy Trusts; Department for Education, 
Educational Excellence Everywhere.
48  House of Commons Education Select Committee, Multi Academy Trust Inquiry: Written Evidence Submitted by 
Professor Pam Stapleton and Dr Anne Stafford, 2016.
49  House of Commons Education Select Committee, Multi-Academy Trust Inquiry: Written Evidence Submitted by the 
Sutton Trust, 2016.
50  Department for Education, Educational Excellence Everywhere,	80.
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implement other models of school financing, such as school-to-school loans, to address 
regional differences in need, procuring goods and services for all schools centrally and 
developing their own services where appropriate.51 
There is a clear appetite to exercise such financial autonomy amongst academies: in a 
survey of converter academies conducted by Reform and The Schools, Students and 
Teachers Network (SSAT) in 2014, greater financial autonomy was the most cited reason 
for conversion.52 Case studies run by the DfE also suggest that high-performing academy 
chains have sought to maximise back office efficiencies across their chains by central 
procurement of services such as catering, utilities, human resources and printing 
services,53 and have developed revenue generation schemes such as IT systems and 
teacher training packages. For example, some have developed performance 
management and pupil data management systems in-house and are now selling them to 
software providers. Others sell teacher training packages externally to outside schools 
and chains, which helps recoup the costs of the programme development.54 Some 
outstanding academies within chains will lead a Teaching School Alliance, attracting 
additional public funds to run school-led initial teacher training, continuing professional 
development and other research and leadership development programmes.55
1.4 Chains as the new ‘middle tier’?
As more schools become academies, it is expected that academy chains will become the 
main vehicle for delivering school improvement. Relatedly, it is likely that chains will take 
on much more of the LA’s role as the ‘middle tier’ for schools, becoming the main 
operational body between central government and schools. While the white paper sets 
out a clear, four-point rationale for why academy chains might be more transformative 
than local authorities, it is crucial that there is a greater understanding about how 
academy chains operate and the effect these decisions have on pupil performance. 
To address this gap in policy research, Reform undertook a survey of academy chain chief 
executives. The objective was to understand the different operational decisions chains 
make and evaluate whether these differences are associated with the size, age or 
geographical distribution of the chain. While the results presented here do not compare 
academy operations with performance, the research aims to open up the ‘black box’ of 
academy chains and provide information that could, in future, be used to assess academy 
chain effectiveness. 
It is hoped the results presented here, and the subsequent analysis, will be a useful 
resource to researchers, policymakers, and the school system alike. Chapter 2 presents 
the survey results for four areas: inclusive growth, governance and leadership skills, 
accountability and efficiency. Chapter 3 presents some solutions to the problems 
identified in the academy chain survey.
51  Department for Education, Educational Excellence Everywhere.
52  Amy Finch et al., Plan A+ 2014: The Unfinished Revolution (Reform, 2014), 3.
53  Department for Education, What Does a High Performing Academy Sponsor Look Like?, 2014.
54  Kreston Reeves, Academies Benchmark Report 2015, 2015.
55  National College for Teaching and Leadership, ‘Teaching Schools: A Guide for Potential Applicants – Detailed 
Guidance’, Webpage, (2016).
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This Chapter presents a selection of results from Reform’s survey of academy chain chief 
executives. For a full list of survey responses, see Annex B. The survey was conducted 
online between May and August 2016. Reform received a total of 66 usable survey 
responses from executive leaders56 of chains with two or more academies. This 
represents a sample of approximately 9 per cent of all academy chains with two or more 
academies, and 15 per cent with three or more. 
The chains that responded to the survey were broadly comparable to the total population 
of academy chains with two or more academies. The mix of primary and secondary 
academies, the proportion of pupils on free school meals (FSM) and pupils with English as 
an additional language (EAL) are similar in the survey compared to all academy chains. 
There is, however, a skew in the survey towards chains with more academies and more 
pupils, more sponsored academies, and greater geographical dispersion between 
academies in the chain. The authors have attempted to mitigate these difference in the 
analysis. More details on the representativeness of the sample are outlined in Annex A.
Initial results from the survey were presented at a small, private roundtable held at Reform 
in early August 2016. The roundtable was attended by chain chief executives that had 
taken part in the survey, senior officials from the DfE, academics and representatives from 
sector organisations. The discussion was held under The Chatham House Rule, but the 
authors have made clear when the below analysis has been informed by the discussion. 
Following the roundtable, the authors held unstructured interviews with six chain chief 
executives and one senior official at the DfE. The names of those interviewed are listed in 
Annex C. Chapter 2 presents the findings of the survey as well as the main arguments 
made at the roundtable.
2.1 Chain efficiency
As academy chains build larger pupil rolls, it is reasonable to expect that, at some point, 
they will achieve economies of scale. This means that their size would allow them to 
operate more efficiently than smaller chains and standalone academies due to greater 
centralisation, increased purchasing power, and operational effectiveness. For example, 
procuring goods and services for all academies in the trust centrally might allow them to 
‘bulk buy’, lowering their unit cost. Centralising curriculum development or, equally, 
allowing high-performing individual academies to pilot curriculum designs, might help 
improve pupil performance across the chain.
While an overwhelming majority of respondents in Reform’s survey believe economies of 
scale in academy chains are possible, there has been no rigorous analysis of the size at 
which chains need to be to deliver this. Indeed, one roundtable attendee expressed 
scepticism about the extent to which significant efficiencies can be achieved by central 
procurement in academy trusts, as savings can be offset by extra costs associated with 
growth. 
However, some roundtable attendees indicated that efficiencies can be achieved through 
better staff deployment in larger chains. For example, where a smaller chain may have 
middle managers that solely oversee one school, a larger trust may deploy them as 
regional managers across several academies, utilising spare capacity and sharing best 
practice. Larger chains with a bigger pool of staff may also be better placed to use 
existing permanent staff flexibly to cover sickness or parental leave, instead of using 
costly temporary or supply staff. As a national employer, larger academy chains might be 
able to attract and retain more highly skilled, productive employees, because of the 
progression opportunities they may offer.  
56  There were 53 chief executives of academy chains that responded. The remaining 13 respondents were either executive 
heads or directors in the trust. However, the term chief executive is used to refer to respondents throughout this report.
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2.1.1 Level of centralisation
Most academy chain sponsors provide their academies with additional services funded by 
top-slicing57 each school’s revenue, known as its general annual grant (GAG). The top-
slice funds the chain’s operational costs, such as central staff salaries and any services 
delivered centrally by the chain. For example, in exchange for a 4 per cent top-slice for all 
academies in the chain, the academy chain trust may hire executive directors, develop 
staff terms and conditions and manage procurement. 
Chains vary in the level of control they have over individual school operations (see Figure 
2). The most centralised service is the development of staff terms and conditions, closely 
followed by procurement and dealing with staff grievances. The least centralised services, 
i.e. those that are, in most cases, delivered by individual academies, are services 
delivered on site, such as printing and photocopying and catering. It is somewhat 
surprising, however, that the virtual learning environment (VLE) is, in many chains, 
delivered by individual academies. These chains are either small in size (number of 
academies and pupil roll) or run by dioceses. 
Figure 2: Operational autonomy within academy chains  
Q10. Consider the following operational functions for individual academies.  Who carries 
out these functions? (Answers are multiple choice)
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It is reasonable to ask whether those chains that deliver more services centrally charge 
their academies a higher top-slice. However, there is no apparent relationship between 
the number of services delivered by the central team and the size of the top-slice. 
On average, academy chains charge 4.5 per cent for primary and 4 per cent for secondary 
schools (see Figure 3). However, a small number of chains reported charging no top-slice (6 
chains; 9 per cent). Contrary to what might be expected, these chains are not run by 
57  Some chains prefer ‘fee’ or ‘charge’, but the authors have retained the colloquial term top-slice as it implies that the 
individual academy’s funding is managed by the chain.
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dioceses, nor do they run studio schools or university technology colleges. They are all, 
however, small chains with respect to school numbers (between two and four academies).
Figure 3: The range of academy chain top-slicing amounts
Q11. (a)-(b) Consider your primary/secondary schools. On average, what percentage of 
revenue does the central MAT team hold back or top-slice from the General Annual 
Grant of these schools? 
To
p-
sli
ce
 a
s a
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 G
AG
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Primary schools Secondary schools
Excluding 0% top-slice Including 0% top-slice
Primary schools Secondary schools
The level of financial control the central team has may impact the number of functions 
delivered centrally. It is reasonable to hypothesise that academy chains with more financial 
autonomy are better placed to invest in central operations, and ultimately better able to 
drive efficiencies across the chain. For example, a chain that varies the top-slice across 
different academies may, in the short term, be able to give more support to a school in 
need and reduce support to a school that is doing well. 
However, the majority of survey respondents (52 chains; 80 per cent) indicated that they 
do not vary their top-slice across different academies,58 suggesting that this flexibility is 
currently under-utilised. The most popular reason for varying the top-slice among the 
remaining 14 academy chains was the support required by the school, with the majority 
charging more for academies that are struggling. One chain reported charging 0.5 per 
cent less as a fee for a PFI school; another reported charging less for those academies 
that joined the trust first.
Another way to more flexibly direct funding and resources across the academy chain is by 
pooling all of the academies’ GAG funding. GAG pooling requires agreement from the EFA 
and means that chains can distribute their funding to academies in the way they see fit. 
The survey responses indicate this practice is not commonplace: 53 (80 per cent) said 
they do not pool GAG funding. However, of those who said they do not, 17 (30 per cent) 
indicated that they would like to. The most common reasons cited for not yet pooling 
GAG funding were resistance from the headteachers and governors of the academies 
losing out. 
2.1.2 Size
As organisations become bigger, their purchasing power increases. As academy chains 
grow, so too should their ability to benefit from economies of scale and lower overall 
operating costs. It is difficult, however, to accurately assess the extent to which chains are 
currently achieving economies of scale. This is in part because school and academy 
58  This excludes variation between primary and secondary top-slices. Most academy chains surveyed vary the top-slice 
amount	for	different	phases	of	school.
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funding for similar pupils in different LA areas will vary significantly, in absence of a national 
funding formula. 
Instead, we can examine how much the central team in a chain delivers (as a proxy for a 
reduced unit cost) relative to its size. The survey results suggest that, contrary to what 
may be thought, larger academy chains deliver slightly fewer services than smaller chains 
when outliers are removed (see Figure 4).59 This is a somewhat surprising finding. In 
research for this report, academy chain chief executives have explained that the chain 
leadership can take different approaches to their academies, often offering more support 
to individual academies that are struggling (such as sponsored academies) than 
academies that come from a position of strength.
Figure 4: The number of functions delivered centrally by size of academy chain
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At present the majority of academy chains are relatively small: over 80 per cent of chains 
have between two and five academies, and over 90 per cent have 4,000 pupils or fewer.60 
This is significantly smaller than the average LA, which has 110 primary schools and 
29,673 primary pupils, and 22 secondary schools and 20,952 secondary pupils.61 One 
respondent said of economies of scale in the survey: “This is a myth. You can’t replace 
150 LAs with 1,500 MATs and claim economies of scale.” This suggests that chains have 
not yet reached a size where they are able to benefit from the level of purchasing power 
available to local authorities, and thus that expansion should be encouraged if greater 
economies of scale are to be achieved. 
Moreover, the survey results indicate that the majority of chain chief executives do not 
think they have grown large enough to begin reducing average costs across the chain. 
Most respondents suggested that in order to start benefitting from economies of scale, an 
academy chain must have between eight and 20 academies and between 2,500 and 
7,500 pupils, with a mean response of 12 academies and around 5,000 pupils. This is 
more than double the number of pupils (2,068) and nearly three-times larger than the 
number of academies (5) in the average academy chain.
59	 	This	is	not	statistically	significant.
60  Reform calculations; Department for Education, Open Academies and Academy Projects in Development, 2016.
61  Department for Education, Local Authority and Regional Tables, 2016.
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Figure 5: Chief executives’ view of economies of scale by size of academy chain 
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Larger academy chains estimated that they needed to grow by a smaller amount to 
achieve economies of scale, and some indicated that they were already large enough. 
This suggests that academy chains do lower their operating costs as they expand, but 
highlights that the majority currently feel insufficiently developed to do so.
2.1.3 Geographical dispersion
The geographical dispersion of academies within the chain was also offered as a factor 
determining the extent to which economies of scale can be achieved. Roundtable 
attendees suggested that having groups or ‘clusters’ of academies is more efficient 
because it becomes possible to streamline regional management and make use of staff in 
multiple academies more easily. The frequency with which staff work between different 
schools, and the arrangements for them doing so, is likely to impact the efficiency of the 
chain. Our survey results indicate that most forms of deploying staff between schools are 
commonly offered ‘sometimes’, but that it is comparatively rare for staff to be frequently 
moved between schools for sickness or maternity/paternity leave (see Figure 6).   
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Figure 6: Likelihood to offer different types of staff deployment
Q23. How often do you offer the following forms of staff movement between schools in 
your MAT? 
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The relationship between closer geographical dispersion and more flexible staff 
deployment is also supported by our survey findings. As shown in Figure 7, the most 
geographically concentrated quartile of survey respondents are the most likely to flexibly 
utilise staff across different schools within the chain, whereas the least geographically 
concentrated quartile are the least likely to make use of such flexible working.
Figure 7: Relationship between geographical dispersion and staff deployment 
practices
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Note: Dispersion was assessed by calculating the average distance between each academy in the chain and the centre-point 
between all academies in the chain.
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However, nationwide, bigger trusts are more likely to be more widely spread 
geographically, measured by the average distance between each academy and the centre 
point of the trust.  
Figure 8: Relationship between pupil numbers and geographical dispersion (all 
trusts)
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The larger trusts in the sample less commonly reported deploying staff across multiple 
academies and to cover for sick or parental leave. This suggests that the greater 
geographical spread associated with larger trusts can act as a barrier to flexible staff 
deployment. This underlines the importance geographical dispersion plays in optimising 
trust development, so large chains are able to benefit from the efficiencies flexible staff 
deployment can deliver.  
2.2 Leadership and governance
2.2.1 With freedom comes responsibility
Conversion to academy status results in the acquisition of a number of additional 
responsibilities. Legal responsibility for the school moves from the LA (or other relevant 
body) to the academy trust. The trust becomes the employer, gaining responsibility for 
pensions, payroll, purchasing compliance, legal and financial liabilities, admissions and 
much more. It needs to ensure that agreements are made on all previous contracts and 
liabilities held by other parties, such as the LA.62 During the conversion process, the trust 
will seek legal guidance to establish the initial arrangements, but the legal responsibility 
the trust holds once set up is still significantly greater than a maintained school.63
The acquisition of these responsibilities is reflected in the skills that the survey 
respondents valued most at different levels of governance. At the trustee level, which 
holds the greatest level of accountability after the Member, the most highly-prized set of 
skills was financial, accounting or legal experience (see Figure 9). 
62  Department for Education, Treatment of Surplus and Deficit Balances When Maintained Schools Become Academies, 
2015.
63  Department for Education, Governance Handbook, 2015.
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Figure 9: Number of MATs rating below skills as one of the 3 most important
19. (a)-(c) Consider your [MAT trustees. executive board, school governing bodies]. 
Please tick by the three skills or attributes you consider most important for the effective 
functioning of that team. Please only tick three.
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2.2.2 The hindrances of volunteerism 
Given the increasing complexity of the role of governors through both academisation and 
chain expansion, the need to recruit skilled governors is overwhelmingly apparent.64 There 
has been wide-spread lamentation across the sector of the inconsistency of governance 
in both maintained schools and academies. However, this does not necessarily equate to 
a lack of skills. It has been suggested that it is unrealistic to expect unpaid volunteers to 
devote the amount of time required to effectively fulfil these extensive governance 
responsibilities.65 Our survey did not find a high level of dissatisfaction with the skills of the 
trustees, executive board or school governors but one respondent noted that the issue 
was about having the time to support and challenge, rather than the skills.
64  See, for example, Chapter 3 in Department for Education, Educational Excellence Everywhere.
65  Grotberg and Robb, Education in Chains.
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Figure 10: Satisfaction level of skills of Trustees
19. (d) How satisfied are you with the current skills mix of your Trustees, Executive Board 
and school governors? Please explain your answer.
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A survey of governors by the National Governors’ Association (NGA) and Times 
Educational Supplement (TES) in 2015 found that 51 per cent of respondents were 
employed and 14 per cent were self-employed. Of those who were employed, 40 per 
cent did not receive their statutory additional leave allowance for governance duties.66 
Maintaining the role of governance as a voluntary one may be limiting what we can expect 
of governors, as Gerard Kelly, former editor of the TES, has said.67 The DfE does not 
currently provide for the payment of trustees in their model articles of association and 
trusts would need authorisation from the charity commission to do this. In maintained 
schools there is no provision to pay governors except in some cases of intervention.68 
However, there are paid roles at a trust level, such as the chief executive and accounting 
officers.
One implication of professionalising academy chain governance in this way is the phasing 
out of parent volunteers. Respondents to the survey considered the most valuable skills 
for the trustees and executive board to be financial accounting or legal experience, 
leadership experience and commercial or business expertise. Parents were among the 
least highly rated at these levels of governance. Indeed, the DfE has announced plans to 
remove the current requirement to have parent trustees.69 
Figure 9 above shows that parental representation is more popular at local governing level 
than the trust-wide level. While the governing bodies may be merged or governors 
removed when an academy chain takes over a school, no respondents were specifically 
removing parent governors (see Figure 11). In our roundtable discussions, chief 
executives voiced the importance of parental engagement. Although it was recognised 
that representation as governors is not necessarily the best way to achieve this, the levels 
of political risk in not including parents on the governing body are high.
66  Ellie Howarth, ‘The 2015 NGA/TES Survey of Governors and Trustees’, Governing Matters, October 2015.
67  Gerard Kelly, ‘It’s Essential That Governors Are Paid for Their Work’, Schools Week, 26 October 2015.
68  Department for Education, Governance Handbook.
69  Department for Education, Educational Excellence Everywhere; Department for Education, Governance Handbook.
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Figure 11: Approaches taken to the governing body of a newly acquired school 
within a MAT
Q20. When taking over a school or academy what approach do you usually take to their 
governing body?
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Some academy chains, such as Oasis Community Learning and E-ACT have established 
boards of local representatives, such as parents, staff and the wider community, who 
communicate their thoughts with the board but are not given governance responsibility.70 
With the demand for such highly skilled governance, recruitment is a serious issue. The 
NGA and TES survey found that half of all respondents agreed it is difficult to recruit 
governors/trustees.71 In its recent white paper, the DfE sets out its expectation that the 
expansion of academy chains will lessen the quantity of governors needed, as high-
quality governing boards take over more and more academies.72 
2.2.3 Mixed messages 
As academy chains expand and require more complex models of governance and 
delegation, there is an increased risk of duplication or confusion between the role of the 
chief executive and local governance.73 Members of local governing bodies may be 
unclear on their role when the school academises and governance responsibility moves to 
the members and trustees of the trust, especially if they are still being referred to as 
governors. There have been cases of academy chains experiencing resistance to change 
from local governing bodies, which the chain is under no obligation to devolve any power 
to.74 The Chief Executive of the NGA says that the NGA frequently receives queries from 
members of local governing bodies of academies in chains that have misunderstood that 
decision-making power lies with the trust or that believed academisation was not going to 
substantially change their role.75
70  Oasis Community Learning, Scheme of Delegation (OASIS, 2016); E-ACT, E-ACT’s New Governance Structure: An 
Overview (One E-ACT, 2016).
71  Howarth, ‘The 2015 NGA/TES Survey of Governors and Trustees’.
72  Department for Education, Educational Excellence Everywhere.
73  Department for Education, Governance Handbook.
74  Richard Vaughan, ‘How Cutting up Credit Cards Saved a Scandal-Hit Chain’, Times Educational Supplement, 29 July 
2016.
75  Emma Knights, ‘When It Comes to Local Governance, We Want to Have Our Cake and Eat It... but Perhaps We Can’, The 
NGA Blog, 5 February 2016.
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One chief executive at Reform’s roundtable expressed concern about duplication by 
having local governing bodies and regional directors, but said that teachers were resistant 
to getting rid of local governing bodies. There was general agreement that when there are 
less than five academies in a chain, the most efficient structure is to have one governing 
body. Above this size, the governance structure becomes more complex and therefore a 
clear scheme of delegation is important. 
Current Ofsted guidance is that inspectors should seek to meet with those responsible for 
the governance of the trust. The recent Ofsted handbook acknowledges that in some 
cases there “may be a local governing body that is wholly advisory, with no formal 
governance responsibilities”, and that inspectors must ensure their meetings are with 
those “directly responsible for governance”.76 However, it does not say that chains should 
be judged unfavourably if they have decided not to have this level of governance.77 Yet 
evidence from our roundtable suggests that experience on the ground is a different 
matter: chief executives felt that Ofsted did not understand how governance in an 
academy chain should work. 
2.3 Barriers to inclusive expansion
In order to ensure national coverage of high-quality sponsors, the white paper sets out 
plans to encourage “sponsors to grow” by “increasing their incentives and minimising 
barriers”.78 The Government is right to tackle barriers to chain capacity. The support 
high-quality chains can offer new academies is likely to help them better utilise the 
autonomy associated with becoming an academy. As discussed, larger academy chains 
are also likely to be able to drive efficiencies by increasing their purchasing power. 
The Government’s drive to encourage academy chains to expand is partly explained by 
their ability to expand into multiple regions across the country, allowing “proven 
educational models to be scaled” and “the system’s best leaders to run more than one 
school”.79 Results from the survey reveal a strong desire amongst chain chief executives 
for their chain to grow. In the short term (next two years) an overwhelming majority of 
chain CEOs (92 per cent; 61 chains) said they wanted to expand by taking on more 
academies. Only four chains surveyed (6 per cent) wanted to have the same number of 
academies in two years’ time, and no chains wanted any fewer. 
Expansion plans are ambitious: all but four want to expand by at least 50 per cent, and 
more than half want to over double in size (with some – even those of a comparatively large 
size already – planning for a four-fold expansion). Those chains already with 15 or more 
academies are slightly less ambitious, but are still, on average, planning to double in size.
76  Department for Education, School Inspection Handbook, 2016, 16.
77  Department for Education, School Inspection Handbook.
78  Department for Education, Educational Excellence Everywhere,	83.
79  Ibid., 16.
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Figure 12: Relationship between current chain size and their plans to expand by 
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However, the survey results show that academy chains do not always look to expand 
when encouraged to do so: over one-third of respondents indicated that they have at 
some point refused to take on a new school when asked formally to do so by someone 
external from the chain, such as a Regional School Commissioner (RSC). This suggests 
that, at present, there are a number of barriers to chains developing in the way the 
Government intends. 
2.3.1 Size, type and location
The survey results indicate that the location of the school can act as a barrier to chain 
expansion. Of respondents who claimed to have refused to take on a new school, the 
most common reason (50 per cent) cited for doing so was the location of the school. 
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Figure 13. Reasons for rejecting a school
Q18. (a) Have you ever declined to take on a new school when formally asked by 
someone external to the MAT, such as a Regional Schools Commissioner? 18. (b) If yes, 
what were the reasons? Tick all that apply
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In the roundtable for this paper, chain chief executives and sector experts explained how 
geographical location can act as an expansion barrier, and also commonly described a 
reticence to take on primary and smaller schools – both of which attract lower levels of 
pupil funding. The reasons are described below.
Taking on schools that are a significant distance away from the other academies in the 
chain may require a costly management restructure of an academy chain. If, for example, 
a chain has clusters of academies with regional managers, taking on a school that falls 
outside of any of its existing catchments may require investment in new management. By 
contrast, responsibility for a new school that is nearby to others in the chain could be 
absorbed by existing management. Concerns have also been raised within the sector 
about the effect a wide geographical spread of academies within a chain has on school-
to-school collaboration,80 which may exacerbate reluctance to take on rural schools.  The 
respondents who indicated that geography has been a barrier to expansion have on 
average nearly 10,000 pupils, whereas those who did not cite geography as a reason for 
not taking on a school have only around 4,500. 
Leaders of academy chains are also less willing to take on smaller schools. This is 
because they are typically more expensive to run.81 Though smaller schools will generally 
have lower overhead costs than larger schools, there are nevertheless base costs 
associated with running a school of any size. As the funding a school receives from 
government is determined by the number of pupils, such costs represent a proportionally 
80  House of Commons Education Select Committee, Multi-Academy Trust Inquiry: Written Evidence Submitted by the 
National Governors’ Association, 2016.
81  Mark Bray, ‘School Size and Unit Costs: International Evidence and Its Usefulness’, Research in Rural Education 5,  
no.	1	(November	1988).
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higher amount of the total school budget for schools with a low number of pupils. 
The relative costliness of smaller schools helps to explain why primary schools are seen 
as less attractive expansion projects, as primary schools have, on average, nearly four 
times fewer pupils than secondary schools.82 The average amount of funding per pupil is 
also lower for primary than for secondary school pupils (by an average of 27 per cent in 
the academic year 2014–15), compounding the relative expense of primary schools.
2.3.2 Financial problems
The survey also shows that chain leaders commonly prioritise financial stability. Nearly 
two-thirds of respondents indicated that they ranked getting more academies out of a 
deficit as “quite” or “very” important when asked to consider their short-term priorities. 
The chains surveyed are also, perhaps unsurprisingly, reluctant to take on schools in 
financial difficulties. Twenty-four chain CEOs indicated that they are aiming to take on 
schools with sound finances, whilst only five claimed to want to take on schools in 
financial difficulties. 
Figure 14: Academy chain expansion plans
Q. 16. (c) If your MAT is aiming to run more academies within the next two years, what 
type of schools is it aiming to take on? Tick all that apply.
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Two notable points emerged from academy chain chief executives and sector experts 
who provided further detail on the characteristics of financially unattractive schools and 
the barriers to expansion they can present.
Schools that have an existing private finance initiative (PFI) – a long-term loan from a 
private company used to finance capital development projects – were frequently 
described as financially unviable expansion projects. In research conducted for this paper, 
a regional schools commissioner (RSC) described schools with a PFI as “by far” the most 
difficult cases to find a sponsor for. This was echoed by chain chief executives, with 
multiple people suggesting a PFI would preclude a school from joining their chain. One 
chief executive reported that 18 per cent of the total budget for one of their schools is 
spent on PFI repayments, whilst another estimated the cost of paying just the interest on 
a PFI loan for a school they assessed as equivalent to the annual salary of a mathematics 
82  Department for Education, Edubase. 2016.
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teacher. Though subsidies for PFI payments can form part of academies’ non-pupil-
related funding,83 it was suggested that the EFA typically do not provide such support.  
Even in cases when chains have agreed to add a school with a PFI to their chain, reports 
of this delaying the process of joining the chain are common.84 Concerns from the PFI 
company regarding the transfer of responsibility for the loan from the LA to the academy 
chain are often the cause of such delays. 
It was also suggested that maintained schools can be more attractive than stand-alone 
academies to chains looking to expand if the school has weak finances. This is because if 
a maintained school has a deficit when it converts to an academy and joins an academy 
chain, the deficit is typically absorbed by the local authority and thus does not damage 
the financial position of the chain. By contrast, a standalone academy holds full liability for 
its finances and it is sometimes expected that an incoming chain takes on the deficit of an 
academy.
2.3.3 School performance
As shown in Figure 14 survey respondents were most likely to indicate that they aim to 
take on more schools that are currently low performing, though almost as many (39 
compared to 33) suggested they aim to take on high-performing schools. 
The white paper sets out plans to introduce 30-month “improvement periods” for schools 
that are currently poorly performing, to help incentivise chains to take them on.85 During 
the improvement period, Ofsted will not inspect the school, allowing time for the chain to 
improve performance. This might help to explain why academy chain leaders are 
seemingly unperturbed by the prospect of taking on poorly performing schools in the 
future. In research for this paper, chain chief executives also suggested that the greater 
scope to improve schools that start at a low base already means that Ofsted is more likely 
to look favourably on the performance of chains taking over poorly performing schools.  
However, some also reported a reluctance to take on schools that are Ofsted-rated 
‘requires improvement’ because such schools are challenging and are not as easy to 
deliver ‘quick wins’ as schools that are in special measures. They suggested this can 
cause a ‘gaming’ of the system whereby chains wait for a poorly performing school to 
drop into Ofsted’s category 4 (‘inadequate’) from category 3 (‘requires improvement’) 
before bidding to take over the school. On takeover, the chain can make some easy gains 
to pull the school from category 4 to 3 because the Ofsted rating was a blip rather than a 
long-term problem with the school. The chain will have appeared to have made significant 
improvement in the school without the same effort invested in those schools that have 
been ‘inadequate’ for longer. It is difficult to verify this hypothesis from the data on Ofsted 
judgements and academy takeover. Further research should examine the extent to which 
chains game the accountability framework – both Ofsted judgements and league tables. 
2.4 Chain accountability
It is crucial that academy chains are held to account for the performance of their 
academies. They must be able to demonstrate that pupils in their academies are making 
progress, particularly for those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
There are a number of different accountability mechanisms for academy chains:
 > Performance tables – in July 2016, the DfE published the first performance 
83  Education Funding Agency, Funding Allocation Pack: 2016 to 2017 Academic Year: A Guide for Mainstream Academies 
and Free Schools Open before 1 April 2016, 2016.
84  For example, see Polly Curtis and Jeevan Vasagar, ‘Schools Prevented from Becoming Academies by Bank Fears over 
PFI Deals’, The Guardian, 16 September 2011; John Dickens, ‘Toxic PFI Legacy Is Pushing Schools towards Financial 
Ruin’, Schools Week, 4 December 2015; Browne Jacobson, ‘Converting to Academy Status for PFI Schools’, Webpage, 
(2016).
85  Department for Education, Educational Excellence Everywhere, 14.
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tables86 for academy chains with three or more academies. Chains were given a 
current ‘value-added’ score and an ‘improvement in value-added’ score for both 
KS2 and KS4, weighted to the number of pupils in each school it has had for a 
year or more.
 > Ofsted – since 2014, Ofsted has conducted focussed ‘batched’ inspections of 
academy chains. When it is due to inspect several academies from the same 
chain in a year, these are grouped together, and publicly available data on other 
non-inspected academies is reviewed by the inspector. No Ofsted ‘judgement’ is 
made, but in most cases a letter to the academy chain and Secretary of State is 
published.87
 > Education Funding Agency (EFA)– academy chains are required to publish their 
financial accounts each year. The EFA reviews the accounts and gives academy 
chains a notice to improve if there are concerns about financial controls.88 In 
exceptional circumstances, the EFA can ask the RSC to hand some or all of a 
chain’s academies to another.
 > Schools Commissioner Group (SCG) – since September 2014, RSCs and NSCs 
have had powers delegated from the Secretary of State to rebroker academies 
from one chain to another if the above accountability systems highlight serious 
problems.
In addition to these, there are a range of other bodies that have statutory duties to uphold 
company and charity law relating to academies, such as the Charities Commission, 
Companies House. The Public Accounts Committee and National Audit Office help hold 
government to account for its spending on schools.
2.4.1 The reach of the Schools Commissioners Group
Reform’s survey of academy chains suggests that, in finding new academy chains to both 
rebroker academies and convert ‘good’ and ‘outstanding’ maintained schools, the 
Schools Commissioners Group (SCG) is not always able to convince a chain that taking 
over the school is in the chain’s or school’s best interest. As Figure 15 shows, a majority 
(61 per cent) of chains had at some point declined to take on a new school when asked 
by the SCG.
86  Department for Education, Multi-Academy Trust Performance Measures: England, 2014 to 2015, 2016.
87  Rt Hon Nicky Morgan MP, ‘Letter to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector’, 22 January 2016.
88  Education Funding Agency, ‘EFA Investigation Publishing Policy’, Webpage, (2016).
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Figure 15: Chains’ power to refuse
Q18. (a) Have you ever declined to take on a new school when formally asked by 
someone external to the MAT, such as a Regional Schools Commissioner? 
NoYes
Whether MAT declined
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Nevertheless, the SCG holds more sway than most other groups of people, including 
other officials at the DfE. Figure 16 shows that chain chief executives frequently decline to 
take on new schools when asked by headteachers or governors of a school; they are 
much less likely to decline when asked by a RSC, NSC or Ofsted.
Figure 16: Sway over academy chain growth
Q.18(c) How often do you decline to take on a new school when asked by the following?
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2.4.2 Reasons for rebrokerage
There is very little publicly available information on the conditions that must be met before 
rebrokerage is considered. Where guidance on this is provided, it is typically vague. For 
example, in a presentation to prospective academy sponsors, officials from the DfE’s 
Academies Group and the East Midlands and Humber RSC Office outlined areas of 
concern which may lead to rebrokering. These include cases where: they “are not 
reassured that the existing trust has the capacity to bring about the necessary 
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improvements at the academy”; where they “have serious concerns about the financial 
performance and/or governance of a trust”; and “where we have had complaints or where 
the school is not actively promoting British values”.89 
It is likely that there are more concerns about academy performance than official data 
reveals. Figure 17 shows the number of academies that have forcibly or voluntarily moved 
between academy sponsors.90 The data collected by the DfE distinguishes between 
academy moves that are “due to intervention” and those that are “not due to intervention”. 
As can be seen, there has been a much higher percentage of moves in the last two years 
due to formal intervention. 
Nevertheless, in an interview for this paper, a senior official from the DfE confirmed that all 
cases of academies moving sponsors (as shown in Figure 17) were a result of 
intervention. The chains whose academies moved “not due to intervention” simply did not 
receive formal warning notices, and voluntarily complied with the RSCs’ desire for them to 
release an academy. While there are clear reasons for complying with the DfE before 
formal intervention processes start, it is suspect that such actions are presented as 
voluntary. This illustrates the high-stake scrutiny felt by both academy chains and the DfE.
Figure 17:  Number of academies changing sponsor by year
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Source: Department for Education, Freedom of Information Disclosure, April 2016, 2016-
0013791. 
Note: The data for 2016 is incomplete, and so not included here.
In the absence of a measurable framework against which chains can be assessed, it is 
difficult to ensure academies are rebrokered consistently. This undermines the 
accountability of both RSCs and chain leaders. Without clear criteria for rebrokerage, it is 
difficult to assess whether RSCs are using the power as often as needed. Indeed, figures 
obtained via a parliamentary question reveal that in the last two years, 70 per cent of 
academies rated ‘inadequate’ by Ofsted have not been rebrokered, leading to 
suggestions that too little is being done to intervene in cases of poor performance.91 
Conversely, some survey respondents indicated they do not feel chains are always given 
sufficient “breathing space” to improve an academy’s performance before external 
intervention occurs. A framework for measuring the performance of academy chains 
would also make it much easier to assess the performance of chain leaders, 
strengthening their accountability.
89  Chris Senior and Debbie Usherwood, Funding for Challenging Schools - Brokerage and Rebrokerage (East Midlands 
and Humber New and Growing Sponsor Programme, 2016).
90	 	According	to	the	figures,	no	academy	has	moved	more	than	once.
91  John Dickens, ‘DfE Fails to Rebroker 70 Per Cent of Failing Academies’, Schools Week, 16 June 2016.
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Nevertheless, analysis of previous rebrokerages cast some light on the areas of 
performance deemed sufficiently important to merit this intervention. Figure 18 gives an 
overview of some high-profile rebrokered academy chains. Themes from the key reasons 
for rebrokerage should part of a more formal framework going forwards. 
Figure 18:  High-profile rebrokerages
Chain 
name
Dates Key reasons for rebrokerage Intervention
AET Between 
December 
2014 and 
April 2015
 > 40 per cent of primary and 47 
per cent of secondary academies 
considered “less than good” by 
Ofsted
 > Attainment gap between most and 
least	disadvantaged	pupils	8	per	
cent higher than national average 
in attainment at level 4 reading, 
writing and mathematics
 > Weak management
 > Eight academies rebrokered
 > Resignation of chief 
executive
 > Trust precluded from 
expansion
E-ACT Between 
May 2014 
and April 
2015
 > 38	per	cent	of	academies	deemed	
inadequate by Ofsted 
 > In eight of the 11 secondary 
academies for which KS4 data 
is available, the percentage of 
disadvantaged pupils making 
expected progress in mathematics 
was below the national expected 
figure
 > Weak management
 > Ten academies rebrokered
 > Resignation of director-
general
 > Resignation of two board 
members
Perry 
Beeches
In progress  > Academy	financial	rules	broken	
by related-party transactions, 
including CEO being paid salary by 
third-party supplier.
 > Academy	financial	rules	broken	by	
trust failing to retain FSM eligibility 
evidence for a period of six years.
 > Five academies and free 
academies to be rebrokered
 > Resignation of chief 
executive
 > Resignation of executive 
head
 > Trust precluded from 
expansion
Lilac Sky In progress  > Headline KS2 results fell by 20 per 
cent below the national average.
 > KS2 and KS4 progress below 
national average for two 
consecutive years. 
 > Nine primary academies 
rebrokered
 > Trust is closing
Sources: Sean Coughlan, ‘England’s Largest Academy Chain ‘Failing Too Many Pupils,’’ BBC 
News, February 4, 2016; Department for Education, Freedom of Information Disclosure, 
2016, 2016-0034749; Education Funding Agency, Review of Financial Administration and 
Governance at E-ACT: Final Report, 2013;  Wilshaw, Sir Michael, ‘Focused Inspections of 
Academies in Multi-Academy Trusts’, 10 March 2016.
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2.4.3 Criteria for takeover and expanding sponsors
When performance of a standalone academy or chain is deemed sufficiently poor, RSCs 
are tasked with “identifying a new sponsor to take on responsibility for the academy 
where this is necessary.”92 The process of assigning an academy to a new chain sits 
entirely with the RSC, although their decisions will be informed by an advisory 
headteacher board. However, there is no publicly available specification for incoming 
academy chains that wish to take over rebrokered academies. 
The National Schools Commissioner (NSC) has taken steps to address the currently 
opaque identification of academy chains ready to expand. As part of a broader package 
of support for chains, the DfE is developing a framework for ‘growth readiness’, based on 
a MAT’s current systems, processes and educational performance. In research for this 
paper, the DfE provided Reform with a tentative growth framework for MATs, including 
evidence of:
 > A track record of school improvement
 > Financial sustainability
 > Risk management
 > Strong governance
 > Good people and leadership
The DfE will be running pilots over the next year to test this with MATs. The continued 
development of the framework, alongside new performance measures for MATs93 will 
provide important information for RSCs when making decisions about chain growth and 
rebrokerage. Setting criteria for identifying poor performance in chains will also be crucial 
for effective commissioning and public trust in the academy chain system.
2.5 Survey summary
This Chapter has presented the first quantitative analysis of what academy chains do, 
including the extent to which operational functions are centralised. There is a mixed model 
of delegation across all functions, but some responsibilities are more commonly 
centralised than others, and the local authority retains an important role in some 
administrative functions. Given the richness of this data, it should be possible to link such 
results to future performance data on academy chains. 
This Chapter also highlights a number of problems with the existing policy framework for 
academy chains. The first is the clear disparity between the current size of academy 
chains and the expectation of the size needed to achieve expected economies of scale in 
the chain. The survey shows that both larger and more geographically condensed chains 
are more likely to make use of flexible staff deployment, suggesting there are productivity 
gains to be achieved in some chain models. 
The second concern is the clear discontentment among chief executives with the skills of 
their governing bodies. This brings into question why so many chains retain a school’s 
existing governing body when it takes over the school. Third, current policy is not 
encouraging academy chains to take on schools in financial difficulties or in different 
geographies. This is problematic for a sustainable and inclusive expansion of academy 
chains.
The survey shows that some chief executives are in frequent communication with the EFA 
and RSCs, and a significant minority has declined to take on new schools when asked. A 
wider literature review has nonetheless found no clear criteria for a chain being asked to 
92  Department for Education, Regional Schools Commissioners Decision Making Framework, 2016, 7. 
93  The DfE expects these to be published alongside performance tables for schools in January 2017. 
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take on more schools or having academies removed. The transparency of the 
commissioning process is in itself a concern, but significant still are the unintended 
consequences of risk aversion in a private, opaque and impartial commissioning process. 
The next chapter provides more detail on these problems and proposes a number of 
recommendations to solve them.
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Survey view
“Make GAG pooling 
easier, provide more 
funding, enable 
growth.”
The results of Reform’s survey of academy chain chief executives highlight a number of 
weaknesses in the Government’s approach to the academies programme. As Chapter 2 
showed, current policy does not effectively help weak schools access high-quality 
academy sponsors, nor does it encourage strong sponsors to build financial resilience 
and develop professional governance structures. 
Further expanding the academies programme to all schools without first addressing these 
weaknesses poses risk. As Chapter 1 highlighted, evidence of the post-2010 converter 
academies programme is only just emerging and, if initial research is correct, the impact 
on pupil outcomes is either small or non-existent. This should give policymakers reason to 
pause for thought. 
Nevertheless, the Government has been unequivocal in its desire for all schools to 
become academies. One reason is that the mixed model of maintained schools and 
academy chains is difficult to sustain, as divestment in the LA model of school 
improvement has significantly reduced resources. However, this divestment has not been 
balanced by intelligent investment in the alternative academy chain model which, the 
Government believes, offers a better mechanism for school improvement. 
This Chapter proposes a new system of funding, commissioning and oversight for 
academies to help the emerging middle tier of academy chains mature. The 
recommendations focus on improving the policy framework for academies, irrespective of 
whether more or all schools become academies. The proposals are intended to strengthen 
the academy chain in relation to headteachers, improve the matching of academies to 
chains, encourage inclusive growth and develop professional support for sponsors. 
3.1 A stronger academy chain 
As Chapter 2 showed, many chain chief executives consider it their role to address 
variations in pupil outcomes across academies in their chain, particularly by raising the 
performance of their weakest academies. Reform’s survey found that reducing attainment 
disparity across the chain was the most important short-term priority for chief executives, 
shortly followed by getting more schools out of ‘special measures’ or ‘requires 
improvement’ Ofsted categories. 
There are a number of different levers available to the leadership of an academy chain to 
exercise this power. The chief executive, with agreement from their trustees, may wish to 
redirect funds from high performing academies to support weak ones, or to help an 
academy in financial difficulty. This may be especially the case if the chain has academies 
in different local authorities, as the absence of a national funding formula (NFF) means 
similar schools and academies get vastly different amounts of money.94 Equally, the 
academy chain may wish to change how it manages its academies, such as introducing 
unannounced inspections or modernising its governance structure.
These powers over academy financing and governance are already permitted under 
current policy, and some chief executives make use of them. As Chapter 2 highlighted, 
just under half (46 per cent) of academy chains responding to Reform’s survey said they 
had either already pooled funding from their academies’ GAG (20 per cent), or wanted to 
do so (26 per cent). Other systems of flexible finance include a pooled academy 
improvement fund and academy-to-academy loans. 
Nonetheless, the policy framework for academy chains is not supportive of those chief 
executives that are risk averse, or work with headteachers resistant to change. One reason 
is that, while the Academies financial handbook 2016 permits the pooling of GAG funding, 
the chain is required to have an appeals mechanism in place for its headteachers.95 As a 
last resort, the headteacher may appeal to the Secretary of State for reconsideration of the 
94  See page 35, Department for Education, Academies Financial Handbook 2016, 2016. 
95  Ibid., 34.
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trust’s decision. It is not known how many, if any, such appeals have been made. However, 
it is clear from interviews for this paper that the mere existence of the appeals process 
means that some chief executives are uneasy about redistributing funding to address 
attainment disparities in their chain.
It is also possible that having the choice over whether to pool GAG funding puts the chief 
executive in a weak position with respect to headteachers. The current norm is for 
academies to pay into the chain through a ‘top-slice’.96 However, interviews for this paper 
suggest this creates a system in which the headteacher views the academy as a client 
buying into the chain service rather than as a branch of the chain.
This tension between headteachers and chain leadership was the subject of a recent TES 
interview with the new Chief Executive of E-ACT, David Moran. Commenting on how he 
and E-ACT’s trustees had approached transforming the academy chain when a third of its 
academies were in special measures and ten of its academies were passed to other 
trusts, he was reported to say: “[s]uddenly I came along and said, ‘We now have a school 
improvement strategy, we’re a school improvement organisation. We don’t sell services to 
you – we are you and you are us’. A lot of principals didn’t like that.”97  This is evidence of 
the difficulty of changing the culture within academy chains and the strength of leadership 
required to do so.
Funding all academies through chains, rather than chains through academies, would turn 
this power struggle on its head. The academy chain would more formally be regarded as 
the employer of all staff in the school, as it already legally is. It would send a clear signal 
that the chain is responsible for academy financing, and holds ultimate responsibility and 
accountability for the performance of each individual academy. The benefit would be a 
more efficient allocation of resources across academies within chains, as those chief 
executives currently inhibited from using financial powers would have explicit and 
unequivocal authority from government. 
This proposal would not be consistent with the existing requirement on trusts to establish 
an appeals process for headteachers wishing to dispute their individual academy’s 
settlement. To support chief executives needing encouragement to establish their own 
chain funding formula, this requirement must be removed. 
The absence of an NFF for academies makes greater flexibility over funding academies 
particularly important, as chains spanning more than one LA currently have to address 
large inequities in funding, even when their academies have similar pupil characteristics. 
Nevertheless, delegating academy budgets to chains without implementing an NFF is not 
a long-term solution, as it would maintain the current funding inconsistencies and could 
lead to the best chains cherry-picking academies in well-funded areas. Thus, while 
government should delegate academy funding to chains immediately, it should 
nevertheless implement the NFF as soon as possible and base chain funding on NFF 
allocations.
To delegate academy budgets to chains, the GAG currently given to individual academies 
would instead be given to academy chains, regardless of their size or track record of 
performance. It would be a decision for the chain as to how individual academies are 
funded. The trustees may wish to maintain the existing deal it holds with academies – for 
example, to hold back a certain percentage from all pupil funding for all its academies. 
This ‘status quo’ option would act as a safety net for those chain boards wishing to 
maintain the amount they currently charge academies for their services.
96  Also referred to as ‘hold back’ and ‘partnership fee’.
97  Vaughan, ‘How Cutting up Credit Cards Saved a Scandal-Hit Chain’.
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Right to maintain the status quo
Chain A currently charges all its academies a top-slice of 5 per cent of GAG funding. In a 
system where chains are funded directly, the chain may decide to allocate its academies 
different per pupil amounts – that is, to introduce its own chain per pupil formula. The 
status quo option would be for Chain A to distribute 95 per cent of per pupil funding to 
each of its academies, thus retaining 5 per cent for its central operations. 
It is not expected that the status quo option would require additional capacity or skills in 
the academy chain, nor create additional bureaucracy. The chain need only know how 
much it is receiving from the EFA for which academies, and calculate a percentage of 
that to allocate to each academy.
As highlighted in Section 2.4 there have been several high-profile cases of financial 
impropriety in both academy chains and LAs.98 However, it is not expected that devolving 
the academy budget to chains would lend itself to any further mismanagement than the 
current system. Under the proposed reform, it is just as conceivable that chains will hold 
less money than they will hold more money from academies, as top-slices may still be 
calculated as a proportion of GAG funding. Chains will still be required to submit annual 
accounts and obtain independent financial audits.
Recommendation 1
All revenue funding for academies should be delegated to academy chains before being 
distributed by the chain to its academies. The academy chain should take responsibility 
for funding its academies and agreeing how much each academy should receive. The 
delegation of academy budgets to chains should be irrespective of the chain’s size or 
performance. The DfE’s funding allocation to the academy chain must be based on a 
NFF for pupils to ensure each chain’s settlement is fair. As the implementation of the NFF 
has been delayed until 2018-19, the delegation of academy funding to chains should 
start immediately to allow chains to more easily address inconsistent funding across 
academies in different local authorities.      
Recommendation 2
The DfE should amend the Academies Financial Handbook to remove the requirement 
on trusts to have an appeals mechanism in place for headteachers that wish to dispute 
how the chain distributes its funding.       
3.2 A beefed-up commissioning body 
The proposal to transfer all academy revenue funding to academy chains must be 
accompanied by strong and effective commissioning and decommissioning of academy 
sponsors. While the schools inspectorate, Ofsted, and performance tables help hold 
schools to account, it is clear that those funding and managing contracts with trusts have 
an important role to play in the accountability system for academy chains.
In the context of schools policy, the commissioning process includes:
 > an assessment of educational need, such as percentage of pupils below 
expected levels of reading;
 > the identification of an academy sponsor to address that need;
 > the establishment of a contract with the sponsor;
 > the continual evaluation of the sponsor’s performance;
98  Audit Commission, Protecting the Public Purse 2014: Fighting Fraud against Local Government, 2014.
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 > termination of the contract where necessary, particularly in cases of 
underperformance, such as poor pupil progress (‘decommissioning’). 
The commissioning of academies is undertaken by two separate bodies: the EFA, which 
is an executive agency of the DfE responsible for funding schools, 99 and the SCG, which 
is part of the DfE responsible for matching schools to academy sponsors.100 Ofsted, the 
independent regulator, has a role in advising the EFA and SCG on the decommissioning of 
academies (through batched inspections), but is not formally involved in finding new 
sponsors or establishing new contracts. Figure 19 outlines the responsibility of each 
commissioning body, its staff costs and workforce numbers.
Figure 19: The school commissioning bodies, 2015-16
Staff (full-time 
equivalent)
Administration 
costs
Responsibilities
Education Funding 
Agency
851 £49.6m	(staffing	
only)
 > Agree funding agreements
 > Allocate funding
 > Oversee compliance
 > Receive academy accounts
 > Support capital projects
School 
Commissioners 
Group
64-80 £5.3m
 > Challenge underperformance
 > Build strong sponsors
 > Open high-quality new provision
 > Facilitate collaboration
Sources: Department for Education, Education Funding Agency: Annual Accounts, 2014-15; 
Department for Education, ‘Regional Schools Commissioners: Regional Vision Statements’, 
Webpage, (2016); Lord John Nash, ‘Regional Schools Commissioners: Answer to Written 
Question’ (HL5859, 3 February 2016).
Notes: *These are the four categories of responsibility used in each of the eight RSCs’ vision statements.
The sections below outline three problems with the current system for commissioning 
academies. The first is no clear distinction between the funding and regulation of academies, 
which has enabled the Government to pursue its interest in fast expansion of the academies 
programme, without enough regard to pupil outcomes. This paper suggests instead an 
independent body to commission academies. The second is a lack of capacity in the current 
commissioning bodies. The paper suggests a merged commissioning body to encourage 
joint-working and the maximisation of existing expertise. The third is lack of clarity on 
expected educational standards when commissioning. The paper suggests that every 
funding agreement includes an element on expected outcomes for the chain as a whole. 
3.2.1 Prevent commissioning cronyism
Both the EFA and SCG have considerable power in deciding which trusts own which 
academies.  While there are formal procedures for exerting this power, and the SCG in 
particular has committed itself to greater transparency,101 both agencies are part of the 
Government and therefore partial. Below presents anecdotal evidence of past 
commissioning decisions that have led to school and chain failure.
In an interview with TES, the chief executive of E-ACT, David Moran, was reported to say 
that, in the early stages of the Coalition Government, the DfE was still turning to E-ACT to 
99  It is managerially and budgetarily separate from the DfE but carries out some of its executive functions. 
100  House of Commons Education Select Committee, The Role of Regional Schools Commissioners, First Report of 
Session 2015-16,	HC	401	(London:	Stationery	Office,	2016).
101  Ibid.
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take on more schools, even when failings in the chain’s financial management were 
obvious: “[w]e are talking about a previous administration that didn’t have a focus on inputs 
and outcomes, but merely had a focus on converting a certain amount of schools.”102 In an 
interview for this paper, the chief executive of AET similarly attributed past failure in some of 
the chain’s academies, in part, due to rapid expansion, which foreshadowed the 
development of their trust’s infrastructure and was encouraged by the DfE.
While these examples of chain failure predate the creation of RSCs, there is nothing in the 
new commissioning structure that prevents unwarranted favouritism of some trusts over 
others. As discussed in 2.4.3 it is difficult to identify this practice without clearer, 
evidence-based criteria for successful and failing chains. However, in interviews for this 
paper, some chief executives felt disengaged from the commissioning process, while 
others considered themselves to be “in the loop”. There are ongoing efforts to address 
this, such as the DfE’s development of MAT performance tables, which will help to make 
the commissioning process less subjective. However, because academy chains are a 
relatively new phenomenon, some commissioning decisions will be based on processes 
rather than pupil outcomes. The development of a system to assess the ‘growth 
readiness’ of chains, as discussed in Section 2.4, is a welcome step. 
The potential for conflict of interest is also a problem for the EFA, whose remit is to both 
allocate funding to trusts and oversee compliance. This is problematic as it is not in the 
EFA’s interest to improve its auditing systems, as any instance of financial impropriety 
reflects poorly on the Government’s academies programme.103 In interviews for this paper, 
at least one chief executive commented that the detail of funding agreements and 
auditing is undertaken by a civil servant within the DfE, not the EFA, which brings the 
impartiality of financial regulation into further question. 
Chapter 2 highlights the frequent contact between the EFA, school commissioners and 
the chain chief executive. As Figure 64 shows (in Annex B), the EFA was cited as the 
second-most frequently used source of advice, after other academies within the chain. 
RSCs were ranked fourth. However, Figure 63 shows that 75 per cent of academy chain 
chief executives reported being in contact with a Regional or the National Schools 
Commissioner at least termly. It is important, therefore, to ensure that the formal 
relationship between the Government, commissioners and academy chains is right.
Recommendation 3
There should be one, independent body responsible for commissioning academies. This 
would require merging the financial accountability functions of the EFA with the oversight 
on standards of the SCG. The responsibility for funding academies should not rest with 
the independent commissioner, but remain with an executive agency of the DfE. If all 
schools become academies, the Government should consider merging the new 
commissioning body with the schools wing of Ofsted, so that there is one independent 
regulator of all schools. 
3.2.2 Increase commissioning capacity
The growth in the number of academies has put immense pressure on the EFA, which, 
since 2012, has been responsible for calculating academy funding, negotiating the 
funding agreements and monitoring compliance. There have been several reports 
highlighting failures in the EFA. The Public Accounts Committee reported in 2014 that the 
EFA “needs to improve efficiency, transparency and accountability in the education sector, 
especially in respect of the growing number of academies.”104 The Comptroller and 
102  Vaughan, ‘How Cutting up Credit Cards Saved a Scandal-Hit Chain’.
103  Eleanor Harding, ‘Academy Bosses Spend Thousands of Taxpayers’ Money on Luxury Services’, Mail Online, 2016.
104  Public Accounts Committee, Education Funding Agency and Department for Education Financial Statements (Public 
Accounts Committee, 2014), 3.
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Auditor General has given the EFA an “adverse opinion on the truth and fairness” of its 
financial statements for the last three years running, and as recently as April 2016.105
The SCG and the increasing pressures put on it has not been without criticism either. The 
role of National Schools Commissioner was created by the previous Labour Government 
in 2008 to extend the academies programme. In September 2014, the incoming 
Secretary of State, Nicky Morgan, announced an expansion of the SCG to include eight 
Regional Schools Commissioners (RSCs). While their remit remains unchanged from that 
set out in Figure 19, the scope of the remit has expanded significantly since the 
introduction of the Education and Adoption Act 2016. The Act requires the Secretary of 
State (through the RSC) to give an Academy Order to any maintained school deemed 
‘inadequate’ by Ofsted and, from 2018, to consider giving an Academy Order to any 
school (maintained or academy) considered ‘coasting’ under the DfE’s new definition.106 
This will undoubtedly increase the workload for RSCs.
While the competency and expertise of RSCs has not been publicly questioned,107 there is 
recognition of a lack of workforce capacity to run the commissioning process. In 
recognition, the Government increased the RSC administration budget from £4.5 million 
in 2014-15108 to £5.2 million in 2015-16 (see Figure 19). This has enabled some RSCs to 
recruit a Deputy RSC.109 However, since having increased the SCG budget, Lord Nash, 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the School System, has commented that “I 
expect in time we may need more regional school commissioners – they will certainly 
need more people”.110
Despite the problems identified, it is not clear whether the commissioning structure for 
schools is in need of additional resources or more effective management, or both. Given 
that per pupil funding for schools will undergo a real-terms cut over this Parliament,111 
Reform does not recommend additional funds for commissioners without first pursuing 
other options, including structural reform, to increase capacity. 
One option to be considered is the potential productivity improvements resulting from 
merging the EFA and SCG into one body. This may facilitate more joint-working and 
reduce duplication. However, a full audit of the skills needed in the independent 
commissioning body should be undertaken. The DfE could consider recruiting skilled 
commissioners from existing headteacher boards. These boards already have a remit to 
advise the RSCs in a voluntary capacity, and so have both sector and commissioning 
experience.
Recommendation 4
The DfE should evaluate the capacity of the new independent commissioning body. It 
should undertake a skills audit and consider external recruitment, such as from existing 
headteacher boards, to address skills gaps. 
3.2.3 Commission for outcomes
A benefit of having just one, independent commissioner is that academy chains’ finances 
and performance may more easily be considered in tandem. Currently, the model funding 
agreement and articles of association for academy chains focus almost exclusively on 
105	 	National	Audit	Office,	The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General on the Department for Education’s 2014-15 
Financial Statements	(London:	National	Audit	Office	(NAO),	2016).
106  HM Government, Education and Adoption Act 2016, Chapter 6.
107	 	Though	anecdotal	concerns	about	the	consistency	of	approach	taken	by	different	RSCs	has	been	raised	in	interviews	
for this paper.
108  £4.504 million in real terms (2015-16 prices). 
109  John Dickens, ‘Another Eleven £95,000 Deputy Directors Appointed to Help RSCs’, Schools Week, 3 June 2016.
110  House of Commons Education Select Committee, Academies and Free Schools: Fourth Report of Session 2014-15, HC 
258	(London:	Stationery	Office,	2015).
111  Reform has calculated a 5 per cent real terms squeeze, taking into consideration cuts and rising prices. See Emilie 
Sundorph, ‘The breakdown of future schools funding and costs’, The Reformer Blog, 1 June 2016.
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governance and financial propriety. While good governance is crucial to school 
performance and pupil attainment, the model agreements make limited reference to the 
performance of academies within the chain, and there is no reference to the overall 
performance of the chain.
This is a wasted opportunity. While there are clear statutory intervention powers that the 
Secretary of State holds in relation to underperformance for individual academies and 
schools, and charity law that governs financial propriety, there are no clear criteria for an 
underperforming chain. As highlighted in Section 2.4, this makes the decommissioning 
(rebrokerage) process appear arbitrary and questionable. In interviews for this paper, a 
number of chief executives expressed distrust of the system for rebrokerage – particularly 
the consistency of approach across all chains.
In addition, the results of Reform’s survey and subsequent expert roundtable suggest that 
a chain’s finances and educational performance are intrinsically linked. What was 
described as a “toxic mix” of poor standards and poor finances can dissuade chains from 
taking over prospective schools. Many high-profile cases of chain rebrokerage were a 
result of both financial and educational under-performance.  
To encourage a more holistic approach to commissioning, the model funding agreements 
for academy sponsors should include a section on pupil outcomes in addition to 
assurances on financial propriety. The outcome element could relate to an aggregate MAT 
performance measure, such as that already developed by the DfE. However, the 
commissioner should have discretion to develop a bespoke outcome element in the 
funding agreement in exceptional circumstances – for example, if the school the trust is 
taking over has both severe funding and performance problems. 
Recommendation 5
The independent commissioning body should develop, agree and manage the Secretary 
of State’s contracts with academy sponsors. Sponsor bids and the management of 
sponsor contracts (‘funding agreements’) should be jointly assessed on evidence of 
financial propriety and educational standards in the chain. Every funding agreement 
should include an expectation of the chain’s educational performance, in addition to 
financial performance. This element of the sponsor agreement could relate to the DfE’s 
MAT performance tables. However, there should be scope for the commissioner to 
develop bespoke funding agreements to encourage sponsors to take on schools that 
have both poor finances and pupil outcomes.
Recommendation 6
Ofsted and the independent commissioning body should consult with academy chain 
leaders to identify the characteristics of an ‘inadequate’ academy chain. In the long-
term, these characteristics should be based on pupil outcomes, such as the aggregate 
MAT performance measures developed by the DfE. Until performance measures are 
sufficient to judge all academy chains, a framework for recognising poor practice should 
be used to inform a judgement. 
3.2.4 One funder, one regulator
The vision of having one independent commissioning body, separate from the funding of 
academies, is not without precedent. In Sweden, the independent Swedish Schools 
Inspectorate (SSI) carries out all accountability functions for municipality schools and free 
schools, including financial compliance, school inspection and assessing the suitability of 
new free school sponsors.112 Funding for schools is separately allocated through the 
112  Skolinspektionen, The Swedish Schools Inspectorate, 2015.
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municipality.113 In some US States, such as Georgia, Massachusetts and California, the 
same body that gives a charter school permission to open also inspects the school, 
judges financial compliance and monitors educational performance.114
Outside the public sector, such as in the electricity and water markets, one regulatory 
body is responsible for holding companies to account for both price and service quality 
(Ofgem and Ofwat respectively) – although the Competition and Markets Authority is 
responsible for assessing fair competition. These independent regulators have the power 
to implement price caps and industry-wide practices, such as encouraging consumers to 
swap providers. However, funding for these public goods is paid for separately by private 
consumers. 
Similarly, there is precedent for evaluating outcomes in the commissioning processes in 
other public sector areas. In welfare-to-work services, such as the Work Programme, 
contracts are designed in a way that specifically refers to the outcomes the provider is 
supposed to achieve.115 Outcomes-based commissioning contracts have been awarded 
by a number of Clinical Commissioning Groups in the NHS.116
These examples from other countries, different public sector services and the private 
sector help establish the case for making academy commissioning independent and 
outcomes-focussed, as described above. The following sections outline the approach the 
commissioning body should take to ensuring there is open competition between academy 
sponsors under this new model. 
3.3 Open competition
The two proposals above to fund all academies through chains117 and strengthen the 
commissioning process require public trust in how academies are given to, and taken 
away from, chains. As highlighted in Section 3.2.3, the academy sector has limited 
understanding of how RSCs make decisions. Earlier this year, witnesses to the Education 
Select Committee expressed concerns regarding unpublished “decision-making 
frameworks” and a “paucity of useful information” publicising the democratic element of 
RSCs – their headteacher boards.118 Since that inquiry, the current NSC has been 
outspoken in his commitment to increasing the transparency of the office.119 RSCs have 
already published vision statements120 and the NSC has committed to publishing 
performance data for each of the eight RSCs.121
While the absence of decision-making detail remains, there are broader policy changes that 
could help open up the commissioning process to more schools and sponsors. More openly 
and regularly publishing lists of schools and sponsors could help improve initial school-
sponsor matching. Requiring expressions of interests for taking over failing maintained 
schools and academies could help improve the quality of the new sponsor and reduce 
unnecessary bureaucracy involved in negotiating with them. Lastly, actively encouraging 
chain-led school swaps could help deliver better education to pupils before formal 
intervention is required. The details of these problems and solutions are outlined below. 
113  Anders Björklund et al., Education, Equality and Efficiency – An Analysis of Swedish School Reforms during the 1990s 
(Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation, 2004); Skolinspektionen, ‘Our Activities’, Webpage, (2016).
114  California Charter School Education, ‘School Development Timeline’, Webpage, California Charter Schools Association, 
(2016); Department for Education, ‘Advisory Commission on Charter Schools – Commissions and Committees’, 
Webpage, (2016); Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, ‘Opening Procedures 
Handbook: A Guide for Boards of Trustees and Leaders of New Charter Schools’, 2016.
115  Hitchcock, Alexander, Pickles, Charlotte, and Riggs, Alasdair, The Work and Health Programme: Levelling the Playing 
Field (Reform, 2016).
116  The Health Foundation, Need to Nurture: Outcomes-Based Commissioning in the NHS, 2015.
117  Not all academies will be in chains, in which case the funding system is unchanged.
118  Department for Education, ‘The Role of Regional Schools Commissioners’, 42.
119  Freddie Whittaker, ‘Publish Performance Data for Schools Commissioners, Says Sir David Carter’, Schools Week, 2016.
120  Department for Education, ‘Regional Schools Commissioners: Regional Vision Statements’, Webpage, (2016).
121  Whittaker, ‘Publish Performance Data for Schools Commissioners, Says Sir David Carter’.
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3.3.1 Improve initial matching
Section 3.2.2 outlined the responsibilities of the current academy commissioning bodies 
– the RSCs and EFA. One critical aspect of the commissioning role is the initial matching 
of schools to sponsors. There are two sides to school-sponsor matching: approving 
funding agreements for maintained schools converting to academies, and rebrokering 
trusts when intervention is required due to underperformance. In Section 3.2.3 it was 
argued that there should be a clear process for identifying a failing academy chain. The 
sections below consider the process for matching the ‘failing’ academy with a new 
sponsor and approving converter academies joining or establishing chains.
There are likely good reasons not to consider every chain when making commissioning 
decisions.  Nevertheless, closing off schools from potential sponsors could mean the 
school misses out on a good match. In an interview for this paper, one chief executive 
described feeling the chain had been overlooked in the rebrokerage of a local school that 
would have matched the chain well. Part of the problem was a lack of awareness that the 
rebrokerage was taking place, as there is no list of maintained schools looking for 
sponsors or ‘inadequate’ schools or academies requiring sponsors. 
However, the DfE does publish a list of approved academy sponsors. Yet though the DfE’s 
website says “we regularly update the list as we approve new sponsors”, the list has not 
been updated since January 2016.122 This may limit the ability of maintained schools to 
find sponsors, particularly well-established medium-sized trusts that may not be known 
nationally. This may, in turn, hinder the development of larger chain structures and the 
matching of new academies to experienced trusts.
A real-time online sponsor forum could help solve this problem. As soon as the 
independent commissioning body approves a new academy sponsor, the sponsor’s 
information could be automatically uploaded onto an online platform. Similarly, as soon as 
a school is deemed ‘inadequate’ and is eligible for rebrokerage, the school’s information 
could be uploaded to the platform. Maintained schools considering academy conversion 
and looking for a sponsor could voluntarily upload their information onto the sponsor 
forum. The platform would be publicly available, as a private list could encourage external 
speculation about the schools putting themselves forward for a sponsor match. This 
would create unnecessary worry for parents, teachers and leaders in the school, who are 
invested in its future. 
The online sponsor forum would enable any sponsor to express an interest to the relevant 
RSC to take over an ‘inadequate’ school. The expression of interest would be a short 
description of how the sponsor could improve pupil outcomes for that particular school, 
submitted online through the sponsor forum website. Equally, a maintained school or 
groups of schools voluntarily wishing to convert to academy status may use the forum to 
email a potential sponsor, and vice versa. With agreement from the school, the sponsor 
should be able to express their interest in running the school to the RSC.
In this system, the commissioning body would retain its right to refuse school-sponsor 
matching, particularly in cases of intervention. To justify its decisions, the National Schools 
Commissioner should continue to develop plans for a readiness check for academy 
chains. The purpose of this is to help establish that an academy trust looking to expand 
can do so successfully. Once the check is fully operational, it could be used on the 
Sponsor Forum to identify sponsors that are and are not ready for growth – similar to a 
licensing system.
It is hoped that making the commissioning process open and competitive in this way will 
widen the pool of sponsors considered, ensure the bidder has thought deeply about their 
ability to run the school, and that the commissioner has good reason to approve or 
122  Department for Education, Academy Sponsor Contact List, 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
academy-sponsor-contact-list,	website	accessed	last	on	8	September	2016.
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dismiss the bid. However, it is important that the bureaucracy associated with expressing 
an interest in running a school is not arduous, to avoid unnecessary spending on 
developing bids.  
Recommendation 7
The DfE should facilitate a real-time online sponsor forum with information on approved 
sponsors and schools requiring or desiring a sponsor. Once a school or academy is 
deemed ‘inadequate’, its information should automatically be uploaded to the sponsor 
forum. Any other maintained school looking for a sponsor may upload their information 
voluntarily. Academy sponsors should be uploaded on the forum as soon as they are 
approved. The forum would allow sponsors to contact schools and vice versa.
Recommendation 8
The online sponsor forum should facilitate expressions of interest from sponsors to take 
over a school. The expressions of interest, similar to short bids, should be submitted 
online and set out how the sponsor should improve standards in the school, including 
supporting evidence. These expressions should be assessed by the independent 
commissioning body on the basis of the needs of the pupils in the school and the 
capacity of the sponsor. The capacity of the sponsor should be determined by its current 
performance and a readiness check.  
3.3.2 Allow chain-led commissioning
Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 outline the intervention strategy and open bidding process for 
taking over ‘inadequate’ schools and academies, and maintained schools wishing to 
convert. However, it may be in several academy chains’ mutual self-interest to swap some 
schools before statutory intervention is required by the school commissioning body. For 
example, an academy chain may recognise they are struggling to meet specific 
requirements of the school, and feel comparatively ill-placed to turn the school around. In 
these circumstances, it is conceivable that another academy chain could be more 
effective at supporting the school and its pupils. 
While it is already possible for academy trusts to seek DfE approval to terminate the 
articles of association trusts have with individual academies and establish new ones, there 
have been no such requests thus far.123 However, in interviews for this paper, several chief 
executives expressed a desire to more easily swap their schools. Chief executives 
explained their current reluctance as anxiety that a school swap would reflect negatively 
on their performance. They also commented that their limited contact with other sponsors 
meant the pool for sponsor swapping was limited. 
It may not be feasible for the commissioning body to actively facilitate school swapping. 
Information on the academies that chains would like to swap would be highly sensitive, 
due to the potentially destabilising effect on the pupils, teachers and leaders in the school. 
It would not be easy for any government-run online system to keep this information 
private. Indeed, the DfE recently lost a judicial review after refusing to release information 
on academy sponsor payments due to “commercial sensitivity”.124 Similarly, government-
facilitated swap meetings whereby sponsors look for other sponsors to swap academies 
with would be open to speculation.  
Nevertheless, the commissioning body would make voluntary swapping of academies 
more permissible than it currently is. One way would be to more regularly publish the 
names of academies that have changed sponsor, particularly when formal intervention 
processes have not begun. The effect would be to encourage conscientious chain 
123  This is to the knowledge of Dr Tim Coulson, Regional Schools Commissioner for East of England and North-East 
London.
124  John Dickens, ‘DfE Reveals £3m Spend on Academy Takeover Fees’, Schools Week, 30 January 2016.
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leadership and continual improvement in all academies. Were proactive school swaps 
more permissible, academy chain rebrokerage might play an important role in a self-
improving school system, rather than be considered as a signal of complete failure.
To avoid chains continually passing on challenging schools, a school should not be 
eligible for swapping if it has been taken over or swapped within three years. This is 
roughly equivalent to the Ofsted grace period (30 months) for schools in ‘special 
measures’, proposed in the education white paper. There should be no prerequisite 
eligibility criteria for the academy chain wishing to swap. By the nature of eligible schools 
defined here, the academy chain will be at least three years’ old.
It is hoped that encouraging proactive swapping will lead to better sponsor-school 
matching, thus improving pupil outcomes and preventing the need for intervention. It 
could lead to the more strategic geographical development of academy chains, and 
reduce dependence on the commissioning body for overall system improvement.
This chain-led system of commissioning academies is, however, inconsistent with the 
recent education white paper’s proposal to give parents the right to petition their RSC to 
change the academy sponsor of the child’s school.125 As with the current headteacher 
petitioning powers on pooling GAG, these systems limit the power of the chain and its 
trustees to lead an education system in the interest of pupil outcomes. Nevertheless, a 
clearer way to engage parents in the running of academy chains is needed – and this is 
outlined in Section 3.4.2. 
Recommendation 9
Academy chains should continue to be able to seek approval from RSCs to voluntarily 
release some or all of their schools. The schools in question must not be deemed 
‘inadequate’ or ‘coasting’, and the chain should be required to find a sponsor willing to 
take the school(s) on. The school swap should not require permission from the 
headteacher or local governing body of the school in question. There should be a 
three-year protection on a school before it can be swapped again.
Recommendation 10
The Government should abandon its proposal to introduce parental petitions in favour of 
requiring all chains to have a clear method for engaging with their pupils’ parents. 
3.4 Inclusive chain growth
As Chapter 2 highlights, there are a number of reasons why an academy chain may not 
wish to take on a school. The most common of these is the geographical location of the 
school, shortly followed by differences in the ethos of the school, the leadership of the 
school, and the fact that the school in question was carrying a current deficit (see Figure 
13).126 
Comments from a research roundtable that Reform held also suggest that chains can be 
reluctant to take on schools deemed to ‘require improvement’ as it may not be quick 
enough to show progress. In contrast, it may be possible to make some ‘easy gains’ in a 
school that is deemed ‘special measures’ to pull it into ‘requires improvement’. 
It is imperative that schools are not left behind as academy chains grow in number and 
size. While it is too early to assess the impact of converter academies on pupil attainment, 
it will become increasingly hard for standalone maintained schools to operate without the 
125  Department for Education, Educational Excellence Everywhere,	18.
126  The cost of PFI repayments has also been cited on numerous occasions as having scuppered academy chain 
takeovers. See John Dickens, ‘Investigation: Who Will Pick up the Tab for PFI?’, Schools Week, 4 March 2016. and John 
Dickens, ‘PFI Costs Scupper School Sponsorship Plan’, Schools Week, 11 July 2016.
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support of a LA. It is also important that those schools with poor but not inadequate 
performance, and those in financial difficulties (such as holding PFI contracts) do not get 
left behind. This section recommends a premium for schools and academies at risk of 
being the last to find a high-quality academy sponsor, which would act as an incentive for 
chains to take on those schools. 
3.4.1 Streamline sponsor funding
The DfE has established a number of initiatives to increase academy sponsor ‘capacity’. 
While there is no clear definition of what the DfE means by this term, it is operationally 
used to refer to increasing the supply of high-quality academy sponsors.   
While a large majority (72 per cent) of academy chains surveyed said they had financial 
reserves,127 the financial position of a school presents a barrier to taking over a school – 
as Section 2.3 shows. Despite this, a pot of £300 million is available from the DfE over the 
course of the Parliament to “support strong and effective multi-academy trusts to grow 
and improve” in addition to a further £300 million to support schools to convert.128 This is 
twice as much as the cost of managing academy conversions between 2010-11 and 
2015-16.129
There is a plethora of different funding streams to support academy chain growth. Figure 
20 sets out recent past funding for the biggest of these streams. Figure 21 shows the full 
set of sponsor capacity funds that the DfE has run since 2010. 
Figure 20: Government funding for MAT growth since 2012 in real terms (2015-16 
prices)
2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16
Total £ per 
grant, 2012-
15
Total 
awards 
since 
2012*
Sponsor 
capacity 
fund £5,141,383 £14,071,797 £11,814,087 £8,262,593 £39,289,860 596
Primary 
chain 
development 
grant n/k n/k n/k n/k
£13,216,667**
244
Northern 
Fund n/a n/a n/a £9,457,033 £9,457,033 65
Total £5,141,383 £14,203,285 £11,909,385 £18,085,450 £61,963,560 905
Sources: Freedom of Information Disclosure, Department for Education, August 2016, 2016-
0034749. Freedom of Information Disclosure, Department for Education, August 2016, 2016-
0037762.
Note:	Original	figures	from	the	DfE	have	been	inflated	using	the	ONS	GDP	deflator.	
*	It	is	not	known	whether	this	figure	relates	to	the	number	of	grants	given	to	individual	schools	or	a	group	of	schools	within	a	
chain. 
** Reform estimate based on the total number of awards since 2012. The estimate is the midpoint of the minimum possible 
spending	(£100,000	for	81	chains)	and	the	maximum	(£75,000	for	244	schools).
127  The academy sector as a whole is thoughts to have reserves of roughly £2.4 million. See Edward Timpson MP, 
‘Academies: Answer to Written Question’ (Hansard, 17 December 2014), HC219279.
128  Department for Education, ‘Next Steps to Spread Educational Excellence Everywhere Announced’. 
129  Edward Timpson MP, ‘Academies: Answer to Written Question’, 2016, HC31449.
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Figure 21: Additional funds for academy sponsors
Name of fund Purpose Eligibility for 
fund
Process for 
applying
Total £
Sponsor capacity 
fund
Set up or expand 
an existing MAT
Open to already-
approved 
academy 
sponsors 
intending to 
take on at least 
one additional 
academy over the 
next 12 months
Send an 
application form 
to the relevant 
RSC
£50k - £100k per 
application
Northern sponsor 
fund
Enable existing 
MATs in Northern 
areas to expand
Open to 
existing MATs in 
Lancashire and 
West Yorkshire 
and North of 
England RSC 
areas
Send an 
application form 
to the northern 
sponsor fund or 
relevant RSC
£25k for MATs 
currently with 
1 - 2 schools 
and £50k-£100k 
to MATs with 3+ 
schools
Primary chain 
development 
grant 
Enable primary 
schools to 
establish a MAT
Groups of two 
or more primary 
academies 
wishing to join a 
MAT.
Register interest 
through the DfE
£75k - £100k per 
group of primary 
schools
Free school 
project 
development 
grant
Enable MATs with 
free schools to 
expand
Potential free 
school sponsors 
and existing MATs
Apply through 
the New Schools 
Network
£220k	for	first	
primary and 
£300k	for	first	
secondary school
£150k for each 
additional primary 
and £200k for 
each additional 
secondary school 
Small school 
supplement grant 
(discontinued)
Enable small 
schools to 
establish a MAT
Primary schools 
of 100 pupils or 
fewer
Register interest 
through the DfE
£5k for schools 
with pupils fewer 
than 100
£2k for schools 
with between 100 
and 210 pupils
Sources: New Schools Network, ‘What Funding Is Available to Help Support the Growth 
of My Chain?’, 2016. Browne Jacobson, ‘Primary Chain Development Grant – the Return’, 
Webpage, (2016). Department for Education, ‘Northern Fund for Academy Sponsors – 
Detailed Guidance’, Webpage, (2016). Department for Education, ‘Sponsor Capacity Fund: 
Detailed Guidance’, Webpage, (2016).
The disjointed way in which these growth funds are run is evidence of a lack of coherent 
strategy for chain development. There is evidence of a similarly ad hoc process for paying 
sponsors to take over ‘inadequate’ schools or academies. Freedom of Information 
requests on the commercial arrangements for sponsors taking over struggling schools 
suggest there are varying sums of money paid with no apparent rationale.130 
The current system is confusing to schools wishing to grow, and neglects other important 
characteristics that may prevent it from being attractive to sponsors. Importantly, 
Reform’s survey shows that geography and financial performance of schools are two 
barriers to academy chain growth. 
130  John Dickens, ‘The £3m School Transfer Market: Which Academies Trust Got What, and for How Much?’, Schools 
Week, 6 February 2016.
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Survey view
“Look at the funding for 
small schools…Offer 
increased financial 
incentives to schools 
in rural areas.”
Simplifying the existing sponsor capacity funds into one Struggling School Premium for 
taking over schools that otherwise would be left as a standalone maintained school or 
academy could improve the quality of the incoming sponsor, and reduce unnecessary 
bureaucracy involved in negotiating price.131 However, the Government’s long-term aim 
should be to withdraw ‘capacity funding’ and encourage academy chains to develop 
reserves that could be used to support their future, sustainable growth.
Criteria for establishing a struggling school premium should be based on the following 
criteria:
 > The performance of the school
 > The size and phase of the school 
 > The location of the school relative to others
 > The financial position of the school
While it may not be feasible to establish an overarching formula for the Struggling School 
Premium based on these factors, the commissioning body should be transparent at the 
outset about whether a school is eligible for the premium and how much a chain can be 
awarded for the school. This would limit the scope and need for lengthy private 
negotiations between the commissioner and the sponsor.  
It will be important to ensure value for money from the struggling school premium.  As all 
chains will sign an outcomes-based funding agreement under the new commissioning 
model proposed in Recommendation 6, it is reasonable to recoup this capital funding 
from the chain if it fails to deliver its contract. It is important that the money recouped is 
proportionate and that the overall system encourages chains to take on struggling 
schools. Recommendation 12 below suggests that the commissioning body consults on 
the exact percentage.
Another potential barrier for chains wishing to take on more schools is the financial 
arrangements in the period between sponsor identification and takeover. When a 
maintained school becomes an academy, the LA will usually absorb any deficits and 
recoup the money through abatement of GAG funding.132 However, there is no official 
policy determining the treatment of deficits for an existing academy. In some cases, and 
particularly when the outgoing chain has completely collapsed, the incoming chain is 
expected to take responsibility for the deficit; in others, the outgoing chain maintains 
responsibility. 
Interviews for this paper suggest there is an intense period of negotiation over the financial 
settlement of academies moving from one sponsor to another. One cause of this 
negotiation is the ambiguity over who has responsibility for finances in the interim period. 
The outgoing trust has a perverse incentive to disregard the financial position of the 
academy before the incoming chain takes over.  For example, it would be in the outgoing 
sponsor’s interest to spend more if it is deficit or has a zero balance, and restrict spending 
if it is in profit.
To prevent such lengthy negotiations and financial impropriety, the commissioning body 
should set out clear expectations for all trusts who have academies that are moving to 
another trust. Excepting situations when the academy chain is insolvent, the outgoing 
chain should be expected to take full responsibility for the finances of the trust before it 
changes hands. It should both absorb a deficit and keep any reserves. 
131  Department for Education, Sponsored Academies Funding: Advice for Sponsors, 2016. 
132  Department for Education, Treatment of Surplus and Deficit Balances When Maintained Schools Become Academies, 
2015.
Survey view
“Pay off deficit before 
the school joins the 
MAT.”
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Survey view
“Remove decision 
making from 
governors that have 
been responsible for 
leading schools into 
difficulty.”
Recommendation 11
All infrastructure funding for academy chains should be pooled to create a struggling 
school premium. The school commissioning body should identify schools that are 
attached to this premium, either due to poor educational performance, their small size, 
geographical remoteness or poor financial circumstances. The premium should follow 
the school, and any sponsor winning a bid to take over the school should be paid the 
premium, and no more. 
Recommendation 12
The commissioning body should consult the sector to identify a percentage of the 
struggling school premium that can be recouped by government if the trust fails to 
deliver to its sponsor agreement. 
Recommendation 13
All academy chains should be expected to invest their own reserves in their 
infrastructure, in addition to public capital funding through the struggling school 
premium. If a trust is required or seeks permission to release some or all of its 
academies, it should absorb any deficits and keep any reserves.
3.4.2 Professionalise the middle tier
As highlighted in Chapter 2, many chief executives struggle to recruit appropriately skilled 
local governors. Nevertheless, chief executives are broadly happy with their executive 
team – many of whom will have taken roles previously undertaken by a traditional 
governing body, such as holding the headteacher to account. However, these are paid 
full-time positions recruited for on the basis of skills rather than representation.
This demonstrates that it is possible to attract governance skills into academy chains. 
There are a range of explanatory factors, including remuneration, prestige and 
progression. To address the persistent poor governance skills and time, the Government 
must make it possible for governors to be paid. It must also recognise that there are 
emerging forms of school governance within academy chains, for which it is not 
absolutely necessary to have a local governing body.
The National Schools Commissioner, Sir David Carter, has commented that he believes 
the school system will need an additional 1,000 MATs by 2020 to match the increasing 
conversion of schools to academies.133 There are currently around 950 MATs, not all of 
which are academy chains (some are standalone academies wishing to expand).
While this paper has not made a recommendation about the number of academy 
sponsors needed in the academy system, interviews for this paper indicate concern 
about the under-supply of high-quality sponsors. Given that the quality of a sponsor is, in 
part, determined by the quality of leadership and governance in a chain, it is concerning 
that chief executives reported in these interviews a problem recruiting high-quality 
directors in their trusts. To develop sponsor capacity, the Government could encourage 
private sponsorship of its Academy Ambassadors programme, which finds senior figures 
from the world of business and the professions to support academy chains. It could also 
consider establishing a Teaching Trust from high-quality trusts, based on current MAT 
performance tables, to develop system leaders.
Given the concerns about developing sponsor capacity, it would be wasteful to ignore the 
current skills in both maintained and academy schools. As more schools convert to 
133  Freddie Whittaker, ‘1,000 New Multi-Academy Trusts Needed by 2020, Says National Schools Commissioners’, Schools 
Week, 2 November 2016.
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Survey view
“Remove local 
governance and 
promote parent 
forums.”
academies, the excellent services offered by local authorities must continue to survive if 
they are in demand from academy chains. While the Government intends to allow 
experienced LA staff to set up or join an existing academy chain, it must also be possible 
for the LA to continue operating as a business, generating income from academies 
through services such as HR, payroll and school improvement. 
As LAs continue to take a diminishing role in managing schools, and the Education 
Services Grant allocated to LAs for their schools reduces, it is possible that some LA 
services will struggle to survive. It must therefore remain possible for LAs to offer their 
services to academies and academy chains outside of their LA area. For example, it 
should be possible for an LA to run a national payroll service. 
Recommendation 14
The Department for Education should amend the Governors’ Handbook to allow 
maintained schools and academies to pay local governors. 
Recommendation 15
Ofsted should review its framework on inspecting governance in academies. It should 
focus inspection on identifying strong internal accountability at every level within a trust. 
While it should be made explicit that parent governors are not required, Ofsted should 
continue to expect a clear mechanism for engaging parents in every individual academy.
Recommendation 16
The Government should continue to seek private funding for its Academy Ambassadors 
programme. It should consider encouraging the development of Teaching Trusts to 
attract and develop aspiring middle and senior leaders of academy chains.
Recommendation 17
There should continue to be no restrictions on a LA’s ability to sell services to an 
academy chain, both within and outside their LA region.
3.5 Conclusion
This report has outlined a new set of policies to ensure the academy programme 
improves education for all. It has recommended a rebalancing of power between 
academies and chains, which puts the responsibility and power firmly in the chain’s 
hands. Alongside this, it has put forward a more rigorous, transparent and independent 
approach to holding chains to account through the commissioning process, and better 
incentives for good chains to expand to the areas that need them most. These proposals 
are important whether or not more, or all, schools become academies.
The report has also presented findings from the first survey of academy chains. This 
provides a new, rich evidence base on which to assess chain performance. It is currently 
not known which strategies improve pupil attainment within chains, and evidence 
suggests variability in the effectiveness of both chains and academies. Reform’s survey 
results provide new information that could aid practitioners, commissioners and 
policymakers in identifying successful academy chains. More research is needed to do 
this. 
As the new Government considers its proprieties for school reform, Reform recommends 
a rejuvenated set of policies on academies to improve education for all. 
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Annex A: The survey sample
The data collection
Reform conducted an online survey of academy chains between May and August 2016. 
The survey questions were hosted by Google Forms and were made publicly available. 
Following a Freedom of Information request for email addresses, a link to the survey was 
emailed to all accountable officers in academy trusts for which the DfE had information. 
Personal emails encouraging survey take-up were sent by Reform to some of the national 
trusts. 
Reform received a total of 66 usable survey responses from executive leaders of chains 
with two or more academies. This represents a sample of approximately 9 per cent of all 
academy chains with two or more academies, and 15 per cent with three or more. 
Fifty-three responses were from chief executives or chief executive officers of a trust, 9 
responses were from an executive headteacher or principal, and the remaining 4 were 
either executive directors or chairs of the trust. No distinction has been made in the report 
between these respondents, as all – with the exception of the chair – are part of the 
executive team, and thus entrusted to run the chain by the trustees.
Questions were largely presented as multiple choice, with a randomised order for 
answers. Not every question was required. A few free text responses were requested, 
some of which have been anonymously quoted in this report.
The sample
The chains that responded to the survey were broadly comparable to the total population 
of academy chains with two or more academies. As Figure 22 and Figure 23 show, the 
mix of primary and secondary academies, and the proportion of pupils on free school 
meals (FSM) and pupils with English as an additional language (EAL), are very similar in 
both Reform’s survey sample and all academy chains with two or more academies. 
Figure 22: Proportion of primary and secondary academies
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Figure 23: Proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals and with English as a 
second language
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The survey was, however, skewed towards chains with more academies, more pupils, 
and more geographical dispersion between academies in the chain. The survey had 22 
per cent more sponsored academies than the average for all academy chains (The skews 
in the sample are not significant enough to warrant disregarding the findings. However, it 
is important to analyse whether some of the survey responses vary across these factors 
to avoid oversimplifying the results. Where practicable and relevant, the authors have 
considered the impact of the size and geographical distribution of academy chains on the 
responses they gave. 
Figure 24). As sponsor academies typically converted owing to poor performance, this 
skew indicates that our sample disproportionately includes schools with a history of low 
performance. 
The geographical dispersion of academies within the survey sample – measured as the 
mean distance each academy is from the centre point of the trust – is also greater, at 10, 
as opposed to 17, kilometres (see Figure 26). Most significantly, the sample contained on 
average nearly twice as many academies as the national mean for academy chains (9 
compared with 5). This translates also into pupil populations also of around twice the 
national mean (4,169 compared with 2,068) – see Figure 27 and Figure 28. The average 
period the first school in each MAT in our sample has been open is 25 per cent longer 
than the national mean, at five rather than four years (see Figure 25). 
The skews in the sample are not significant enough to warrant disregarding the findings. 
However, it is important to analyse whether some of the survey responses vary across 
these factors to avoid oversimplifying the results. Where practicable and relevant, the 
authors have considered the impact of the size and geographical distribution of academy 
chains on the responses they gave. 
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Figure 24: Proportion of sponsor and converter academies
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Figure 25: Age distribution based on year of first academy opening 
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Figure 26: Geographical disperion distribution
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Note: Dispersion was assessed by calculating the average distance between each academy in the chain and the centre-point 
between all academies in the chain.
59
Academy chains unlocked / Annex A: The survey sample
Figure 27: Size distribution (number of pupils)
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Figure 28: Size distribution (number of academies)
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Annex B: The survey results
The section below presents the results from Reform’s survey of 66 chief executives of 
academy chains. All responses from Question 10 onwards have been presented. 
Questions 1 to 9 asked for basic information such as the name, size and mix of schools in 
the trust. It should be noted that not all questions were compulsory to answer, and thus 
there are not always 66 responses.
Figure 29: Level of centralisation
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Figure 30: Top-slice
Q11. (a)-(b) Consider your primary/secondary schools. On average, what percentage of 
revenue does the central MAT team hold back or top-slice from the General Annual 
Grant of these schools? (numerical free text)
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Figure 31: Variation of the top-slice
Q11. (c) Does the amount you hold back vary across your schools (excluding differences 
between primary and secondary schools)? (multiple choice)
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Figure 32: Reasons for variance
Q11. (d) If yes, for what reasons? (free text response)
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Note: Some MATs held back more and others less from schools that were struggling. The MAT that cited PFI as a reason for 
variance held back less from this school. The MAT that cited date of joining as a reason had a smaller fee for schools that joined 
the	MAT	first.
Figure 33: Future plans for top-slice
Q11. (e) What are your plans for the amount you hold back/top-slice in the near future 
(next two years)? (multiple choice)
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Figure 34: Pooling the GAG
Q12. (a) Has your MAT ever pooled funding from the General Annual Grant to redistribute 
school funding across the MAT? (multiple choice)
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Figure 35: Demand to pool GAG
Q12. (b) If no, would you like to? (multiple choice)
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Figure 36: Barriers to pooling the GAG
Q12. (c) If applicable, what has been the biggest barrier to pooling GAG funding? 
(combination of multiple choice and free text)
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Note:	‘Other’	consists	of	opposition	to	change,	the	size	of	the	MAT	and	the	finance	team	not	yet	being	sufficiently	developed.
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Figure 37: Income generation 
Q13. Consider the way the MAT generates income. What functions have been used by 
the central MAT team as an area of income generation (separate from individual school 
income generation)? (multiple choice and free text)
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Note: ‘Other’ includes lettings, selling their brand overseas, school to school support services and national school support, IT 
services and therapy services.
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Figure 38: Financial health 
Q14. What is the status of your current budget for the year ending in August 2016? 
Please indicate whether you are in deficit or have cash reserves, e.g. “Deficit of 
£100,000” (free text)
Deficit
In-year deficit
Reserves
Balanced
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2
3
48
Figure 39: Number of academies needed for economies of scale 
Q15. (a) Consider the number of schools in your MAT. In your view, what number of 
schools would your MAT need to be to begin achieving economies of scale, i.e. reduce 
the unit cost of the things you buy? (free text)
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Figure 40: Number of pupils needed for economies of scale 
Q15. (b) Consider the number of pupils in your MAT. In your view, what number of pupils 
would your MAT need to have to begin achieving economies of scale, i.e. reduce the unit 
cost of the things you buy? (free text)
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Figure 41: Short-term growth plans
Q16. (a) Consider your short-term plans. In the short term (the next 2 years), is your MAT 
aiming to run the same, more or fewer academies? (multiple choice)
Nu
m
be
r o
f M
AT
s
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
More
Number of academies planning to run in the next two years
Same Fewer
4
61
68
Academy chains unlocked / Annex B: The survey results
Figure 42: Short-term growth plans compared to current size
Q16. (b) How many schools do you envisage running in 2 years’ time, by the end of the 
academic year 2018-2019? (free text)
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Note: Where a range of values is given, the median has been taken.
Figure 43: Short-term takeover strategy
Q16. (c) If your MAT is aiming to run more academies within the next two years, what 
type of schools is it aiming to take on? Tick all that apply.
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Note: ‘Other’ includes church schools, post-16 provision, schools in the local area and special and alternative provision.
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Figure 44: Long-term comparative growth plans
Q17. (a) Consider your longer term plans. In the long-term (the next 5 years), is your MAT 
aiming to run the same, more or fewer academies?
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Figure 45: Long-term growth plans
Q17. (b) How many schools do you envisage running in five years’ time, by the end of the 
academic year 2021-22? (free text)
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Figure 46: Turning down new schools
Q18. (a) Have you ever declined to take on a new school when formally asked by 
someone external to the MAT, such as a Regional Schools Commissioner? 
NoYes
Whether MAT declined
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Figure 47: Reasons MATs for turning down new schools
Q18. (b) If yes, what were the reasons? Tick all that apply. (multiple choice)
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Note: ‘Other’ includes the MAT lacking expertise of that school type, the performance of the school was too low, not wanting 
another secondary and LA resistance.
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Figure 48: How often new schools are turned down
Q18. (c) If yes, how often do you decline to take on additional schools when asked by 
the following? (multiple choice)
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Figure 49: Immediate and short-term priorities 
Q18. (d) Consider your immediate, short-term priorities. How important do you consider 
the following? (multiple choice)
Nu
m
be
r o
f M
AT
s
Importance
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Reducing the number of schools
Getting more schools out of deficit
Increasing the number of schools
Reducing attainment disparity across the MAT
Getting more schools out of special 
measures or requires improvement 
Not very
important at all
Not very
important
Not important
at all
NeitherQuite importantVery important
20
23
4846
1
24
26
108
3
13
10
5
2 1
8
2 2 2 4
10
7
4 2
7
42
72
Academy chains unlocked / Annex B: The survey results
Figure 50: Skills valued at different levels of governance in the MAT
Q19. (a)-(c) Consider your MAT Board of Trustees/Executive Board/school governing 
bodies. Please tick by the three skills or attributes you consider most important for the 
effective functioning of that team. Please only tick three. (multiple choice)
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Figure 51: Satisfaction with governance skillset
Q19. (d) How satisfied are you with the current skills mix of your Trustees, Executive 
Board and school governors? Please explain your answer. (free text response)
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Note: Unknown mainly refers to where the respondent did not answer this question.
73
Academy chains unlocked / Annex B: The survey results
Figure 52: Approaches to governing bodies on conversion
Q20. When taking over a school or academy what approach do you usually take to their 
governing body? (multiple choice and free text)
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Note: The responses for ‘other’ include varying approaches depending on the context of the school, the governing body and 
Ofsted judgements and a mixture of the given approaches and skills audits.
Figure 53: Means of recruiting for different roles
Q21. What is the primary means by which you recruit for the following roles? (multiple 
choice)
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Figure 54: Succession plans
Q22. Please tick by the roles for which you already have a succession plan. (multiple 
choice)
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Figure 55: Staff movement within the MAT
Q23. How often do you offer the following forms of staff movement between schools in 
your MAT? (multiple choice)
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Figure 56: Formal staff mobility clauses 
Q24. (a) Do you have a ‘mobility clause’ in any of your staff contracts? A mobility clause 
can require staff to relocate according to the needs of their employer, within certain 
limits. (multiple choice)
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Figure 57: Staff contracts with mobility clauses
Q24. (b) If yes, to which staff does this apply? (multiple choice and free text)
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Note: ‘Other’ includes business managers, new employees and some therapists and teachers.
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Figure 58: Staff movement 
Q25. (a) Roughly how many members of staff have you moved, either permanently or on 
secondment, to another school in your MAT over the last year? If not known, write “not 
known”. (free text)
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Figure 59: Staff movement for promotion
Q25. (b)-(c) Of these, how many would you consider the move a promotion/demotion?  
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	Note:	Not	all	answered	as	not	all	had	used	staff	movement	between	schools	in	the	MAT.
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Figure 60: Aspects of school performance monitored 
Q26. Which aspects of school performance are monitored by the Trustees or Executive 
Team, and how often? (multiple choice)
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Figure 61: Means of monitoring individual school performance
Q27. How is the performance of individual schools monitored by the MAT? (multiple 
choice)
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Figure 62: Forms of external monitoring used by the MAT
Q28. What forms of external monitoring has your MAT used for individual schools within 
the MAT (excluding formal accountability mechanisms)?
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Note: The responses for other include peer review and coaching, internal moderation, Pupil Premium review, audits and 
financial	reviews	and	external	quality	assurance
Figure 63: Communication with commissioners 
Q29. How often does the leadership of the MAT communicate with your Regional School 
Commissioner (either by phone, email or writing)? Please answer even if more than one 
RSC applies, or the National Schools Commissioner applies. (multiple choice)
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Figure 64: External advice
Q30. How often do you receive advice from the following? The advice could be about 
school improvement, finances or any specific issue. 
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Annex C: List of interviewees
The research for this paper was informed by seven unstructured interviews, lasting 
approximately one hour each. The content of the discussions was confidential. The full list 
of interviewees is as follows:
 > Ian Comfort, Chief Executive, Academies Enterprise Trust
 > Dr Tim Coulson, Regional Schools Commissioner for East if England and North-
East London, Department for Education
 > Samantha Beecham, Director of Operations, E-ACT
 > Dame Maureen Brennan, Executive Headteacher, Matrix Academy Trust
 > Gary Peile, Chief Executive, The Active Learning Trust
 > Debbie Godfrey-Phaure, Chief Executive Officer, Avonbourne International 
Business and Enterprise Trust
 > David Moran, Chief Executive, E-ACT
 > Professor Toby Salt, Chief Executive, Ormiston Academies Trust
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